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ABSTRACT 
This paper compares the German Basic Law and New Zealand's constitutional 
framework. The author does not deal with the contents of both 'constitutions', but 
rather sets the focus on two other issues. First, why does New Zealand still have an 
unwritten constitution whereas Germany and most other 'western' democracies are 
governed by a written and entrenched constitution with supreme law status, and 
second, what approach to realize constitutional principles is preferable? 
It is argued that the reasons for the current 'constitutional' situation in both 
countries are mainly based in their constitutional history. In contrast to New Zealand, 
Germany's history is marked or influenced by several wars and major revolutions, 
which all resulted in the desire for a "fresh start" and therefore in a reorganization of 
the state order. In contrast to New Zealand, Germany has, at least until World War I, 
always been in the centre of world policy and intellectual development. As a 
consequence, it is not surprising that New Zealand never had to reconsider its 
constitutional framework significantly. Just as the historical reasons, this paper 
considers the different characteristics of Germans and New Zealanders as important 
factors influencing the constitutional development of both countries. 
Reflecting on the major principle of constitutionalism of limited government 
and evaluating advantages and disadvantages of both approaches, the author finally 
concludes that a written entrenched constitution with supreme law status is 
favourable. 
To understand both approaches to constitutionalism, this paper begins with a 
general introduction to the meaning of constitutions and the development of 
constitutionalism until the enactment of the Constitution of the United States in 1787. 
Additionally, the author portrays briefly the most crucial events in Germany's and 
New Zealand's constitutional history. 
Word Length 
The text of this paper (excluding contents page, footnotes, bibliography and 
appendix) comprises approximately 13067 words. 
1 
I INTRODUCTION 
In general, constitutionalism is regarded as the political idea that all state 
organs, including the Head of State, are bound by certain provisions of law. 1 At 
first glance, the major difference between New Zealand's and Germany's 
constitutions is that New Zealand is governed by an unwritten and Germany by a 
written constitution in the classical sense. Although this seems to be only a 
formal distinction, it rather mirrors in this case that Germany's constitution in 
contrast to New Zealand's is entrenched and has the status of a supreme law. 
Therefore, a comparison of the German and the New Zealand constitution means 
a comparison between two completely different approaches to the realization of 
the concept of constitutionalism, especially of the interpretation of the term 
bound. 
The comparison between the German and the New Zealand constitution is 
particularly interesting because of two grounds. Firstly, the German as well as 
the New Zealand legal system are based on the European cultural environment 
and its development during the last two millenniums. European scholars and 
philosophers and the European understanding of democracy and 
constitutionalism have influenced both countries to a similar extent. 
Nevertheless, they have developed for some reasons two different kinds of 
constitutions. 
The second reason 1s that after 140 years of largely constitutional 
'apathy', the discussion about the establishment of a 'real' constitution in New 
Zealand became again very topical after the constitutional crisis in 1984 that 
eventually resulted in the enactment of the Constitution Act 1986. Additionally, 
the ratification of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights in 
1978 contributed to the discussion significantly. This is because it is questionable 
whether New Zealand can fulfil its legal obligations in terms of Human Rights 
with the enactment of the Bill of Rights Act 1990 (BORA).2 Are Human Rights 
really protected sufficiently by such a 'constitution'? In 2000, the discussions 
1 Konstitutionalismus (Constitutionalism) <http://www20.wissen.de/xt/default.do> (last accessed 
31 October 2002). 
2 The BORA is regarded as an element of the constitution but is nevertheless amendable by a 
simple majority in Parliament. 
2 
about the New Zealand constitutional framework culminated temporarily in the 
"Building the Constitution" conference that animated further disagreements 
rather than provided an acceptable solution. Consequently, the constitution and 
possible reforms or changes are still very topical in New Zealand. 
Regarding the structure of the paper, a comparison of different 
constitutions or rather a comparison of different ways to realize the ideas of 
constitutionalism requires first of all an introduction to constitutionalism and the 
meaning as well as the development of constitutions in general. After this, the 
author will illustrate Germany's constitutional history from the Goldene Bulle in 
1356 to the German Basic Law of 1949 (BL). The description of New Zealand's 
constitutional history begins with the signing of the Treaty of Waitangi in 1840 
and ends with the enactment of the Constitution Act 1986. 
As the main difference between the German and the New Zealand 
constitution is that the BL is entrenched legislation with supreme law status, the 
focus of the examination is set on the question why New Zealand, in contrast to 
Germany (and many other countries), has never enacted such an entrenched 
supreme law. How is it possible to differ from one another on such a legally 
fundamental question, even the legal roots of both countries are in Europe? This 
paper attempts to find an answer by evaluating the historical development of both 
countries. Further, the author considers the issue whether a written and 
entrenched constitution is preferable. 3 As among the more than 100 democratic 
states in the world, only the constitutions of the United IGngdom, New Zealand 
and Israel are unwritten and not entrenched,4 this question has to arise. 
However, the first conclusion can be drawn at the beginning of the paper. 
A constitution is compulsory in order to govern the relationship between the state 
and its citizens if democracy and the rule of law are favoured. 
3 It has to be stressed at this point that the distinction between entrenched and non entrenched 
constitutions is not equivalent to the distinction between written and unwritten constitutions. 
Although unwritten constitutions are never entrenched, it is possible for a written constitution to 
be not entrenched. The relationship between unwritten constitutions and constitutions with 
supreme law status is similar. Unwritten constitutions never have the status of supreme law, 
whereas almost every written and entrenched constitution is conferred supreme law status. 
CF Strong ( ed) Modern Political Constitutions (3 ed, Sidgwick & Jackson, London, 1949) 65 . 
4 United ations Development Programme The Constitution and its Relationship to the 
Legislature <http :magnet.undp.org/Docs/parliaments/Constitutions.htrn> (last accessed 31 
October 2002). 
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Man's unending search for the widest freedom to pursue his own ends within 
ordered society explains his acceptance of government. He tolerates gentle fetters 
from the State to escape the heavy chains of anarchic chaos and to gain the 
opportunities for collective action and division of labor that, in the modern world, 
are available only within the State. Yet, a State powerful enough to maintain order 
may also be strong enough to suppress liberty. Because of his fear that Leviathan 
might become a Frankenstein monster, Man equips the machinery of government 
with brakes as well as a motor.
5 
II WHAT IS A CONSTITUTION? 
We must first explain some general features of constitutions. What are 
constitutions and what are their essential elements? 
A Different Meanings of the Term 'Constitution' 
The English word constitution derives from the Latin express10n 
constitutio, meaning establislunent or ordinance by the emperor.
6 In order to find 
a general definition of the term constitution, an encyclopaedia is a good place to 
start. This provides three meanings of constitution: 
7 
-+ Political - sociological meaning 
A constitution is the mode in which a state is constituted or 
organized. Characteristic therefore are firstly the location of the 
sovereign power (as a monarchical, oligarchic, or democratic 
constitution) and secondly, the methods of administration as well 
as the legal status of the citizens 
5 William G Andrews (ed) Constitutions and Constitufionalism (1 ed, D van ostrand Company, 
New York, 1961) 9. 
6 Homepage of the University of ew England 
<http://www.une.edu.au/-arts/Politics/constit.htm> (last accessed 31 October 2002). 
7 Yerfassung (Constitution) <http://www20.wissen.de/xt/default.do> (last accessed 31 October 
2002). 
4 
-+ Meaning of constitution in terms of its legal content 
All legal norms referring to the constitution in the above 
definition, including customary law. This definition describes the 
term constitution as the whole area of constitutional law. 
-+ Technical meaning of constitution 
A system or body of fundamental principles according to which a 
nation, state, or body politic is constituted and governed. This is 
most frequently a written constitutional charter that encompasses 
the whole constitutional law. 
As this paper compares different ways of realizing the ideas of 
constitutionalism, it is not necessary to examine the differences between these 
three meanings in detail. Most relevant for this paper is the technical meaning of 
the term constitution because neither the form of government nor the contents of 
the constitutions are compared. It is therefore sufficient to bear in mind the 
following definition, which encompasses both the German and New Zealand 
system: 
The term constitution in a broad sense refers to the rules by which government is 
conducted. It is the means by which the whole system of central government is 
established: it is the source from which the functions and powers of government 
derive; furthermore, it regulates the functions of government. It also establishes the 
rights of citizens, and describes the relationship between the state and the 
individual. 8 
Or shorter: 9 
Fundamental principles of government in a nation, either implied in its laws, 
institutions, and customs, or embodied in one fundamental document or in several. 
The New Zealand constitution falls under the first category, customary and 
unwritten constitutions, whereas the German constitution meets the requirements 
of the second category, as it is embodied in one fundamental document, the BL. 
8 Morag McDowell and Duncan Webb (eds) The New Zealand l egal System (2 ed, Butterworths, 
Wellington, 1998) 98 . 
9 Infoplease.com Constitution <http://www.infoplease.com/ce6/history/ A0813343.html> (last 
accessed 31 October 2002). 
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As entrenchment and supreme law status are issues relevant to the 
implementation of constitutional ideas, these rather general definitions 
encompass neither of them. 
B Elements of a Constitution 
Although constitutions are, according to the given definition, supposed to 
contain only the fundamental principles of government, their scope varies from 
country to country. The official constitution of Norway, for example, consists of 
only 25 pages, whereas India's constitution of 1950 encompasses 250 pages. 
Although this might mislead one into thinking that the scope of constitutions is 
connected with the population of the respective country, there are other reasons 
for this discrepancy. Among all existing constitutions one dividing line can be 
drawn between countries that regard their constitution primarily and almost 
exclusively as a legal document in which there is room for rules of law only; and 
countries, like India, that think of their constitution as a kind of manifesto, which 
comprises, besides the mentioned fundamental principles, a confession of faith 
and a statement of ideals. These countries regard their constitutions more as a 
charter of the land. 10 
Notwithstanding the writtenness
11
, supreme law status or entrenchment of 
a constitution, the following elements have become essential parts of every 
constitution (at least in democratic states).
12 
1° Kenneth Clinton Wheare (ed) Modern Constitutions (2 ed, Oxford University Press, London, 
1966) 32. 
11 This term has been taken from: Homepage of the Stanford University Constitutionalism 
<http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/constitutionalism> (last accessed 31 October 2002). 
12 United Nations Development Programme The Constitution and its Relationship to the 
Legislature <http :magnet.undp.org/Docs/parliaments/Constitutions.htm> (last accessed 31 
October 2002) . 
As the BL includes all these elements, the respective Articles are cited underneath. 
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~ A preamble, which contains mostly a short introduction to the 
country's governing principles. 
13 
~ A chapter that comprises fundamental rights and freedoms of 
individuals (social rights as well as political) 
(Articles 1-19, 20 para 4, 33, 38 BL) 
~ A part dealing with the division of powers or systems of checks 
and balances within the nation's governing institutions, as well as 
between central government and its states or provinces 
(Articles 20 paras 2/3, 28 BL) 
~ A description of the structure of the governing institutions, 
including all constitutional obligations of the legislative, judicial 
and executive branches. 
(Articles 38 - 104 BL) 
~ A commitment to a political party system or alternative system 
and an outline for the selection of government officials. 
(Articles 21, 62-69 BL) 
~ Provisions explaining the procedures and circumstances for 
amending, revising or suspending the constitution. 
(Articles 79, 146 BL) 
According to the definition given above, New Zealand provides most of 
these fundamental elements in its laws, institutions and customs. A compilation 
of all elements of New Zealand's constitutional framework will be supplied later 
in this paper. 
III CONSTITUTIONAL/SM AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF 
CONSTITUTIONS IN GENERAL 
Having illustrated the meaning of constitutions in general, it is further of 
interest how constitutionalism and constitutions have developed. 
13 All relevant provisions of the BL are provided in the Appendix, Part A. 
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The term constitutionalism is fairly recent in its origin, although the idea 
can be traced back to the ancient Greeks. 
14 To provide a definition, 
constitutionalism is regarded as: 
[t]he political idea that fustly government can and should be legally limited in its 
powers by a ' fundamental ' law, or set of laws, beyond the reach of the individual 
government to alter, and secondly, that the authority of the government depends on 
its acting in compliance with these limitations. 
15 
As constitutionalism encompasses both libertarian and procedural aspects, 
these limitations concern first the relationship between government and its 
citizen, and second, the relationship between government authorities. 
16 
Constitutionalism became the counterpart of Absolutism and Restoration in the 
18th century caused by the doctrine of the separation of powers by Locke and 
Montesquieu as well as by the idea that human rights have to be transferred into 
basic rights conferred by the state.
17 
In this chapter the author will describe the origins and preconditions of 
constitutionalism as well as its historical development until the establishment of 
the Constitution of the United States, which is regarded as the first important 
written constitution and served as a model for a vast number of subsequent 
constitutional documents. 18 
14 According to the Oxford English Dictionary, the term 'constitutionalism' was first used in 
1832. Others assert that the word was coined in America during the Revolution 1776. Some 
scholars allege that the adjective 'constitutional' was a novelty even in the mid-eighteenth 
century, but the noun 'constitution, with a political meaning, came into use during the English 
debates that led to the outbreak of the Civil War in 1642. The Oxford English Dictiona,y reports 
uses of that word sense as early as the 12
th century, but it was the English debates of the Civil 
War period, and after the Glorious Revolution of 1688, that fumly established 'constitution ' and 
its cognates as elements of the modern political vocabulary. 
Scott Gordon (ed) Controlling the State- Constitutionalismfrom Ancient Athens to Today (1 ed, 
Harvard University Press, London, 1999) 5. 
15 Homepage of the Stanford University Constitutionalism 
<http ://plato.stanford.edu/entries/constitutionalism> (last accessed 31 October 2002). 
16 William G Andrews (ed) Constitutions and Constitutionalism (I ed, D van ostrand Company, 
ew York, 1961) 14. 
17 Konstitutionalismus (Constitutionalism) <http: //www20.wissen.de/xt/default.do> (last accessed 
31 October 2002). 
18 The Constitution of the United States was written in 1787 and ratified in 1789. 
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A Natural Law and Constitutionalism 
The roots of constitutionalism are based in the awareness and assuredness 
of the existence of a higher law, the so-called natural law. However, 
constitutionalism cannot be equated with natural law, as it is but one of its 
aspects. 19 The legal institute of natural law had and still has much more influence 
on modem thinking and legal understanding, but a deeper evaluation of this is 
beyond the scope of this paper. 
1 The Ancient Greeks and the Stoics of Greece and Rome 
The Ancient Greeks and their famous philosophers (Socrates, Sophocles, 
Plato, Aristotle, Heraclitus) built the key concepts of natural law in the 
consciousness of European people. Heraclitus, for example, contributed to the 
emergence of a divinely inspired, universal, immutable and eternal natural law 
by stating that there has to be one law, which sustains all human laws and is 
infinitely strong.20 Plato's theory of the ideal human law, which exists only in the 
world of ideas expressed the same view.
21 However, Aristotle has contributed the 
most to the creation of a natural law with his theory of knowledge and his 
Metaphysics. He can therefore be regarded as the 'father of natural law' .
22 
Notwithstanding these approaches, the idea of a natural law remained a 
hypothesis and was regarded as an intellectual standard not serving as an 
instrument for juridical decisions.
23 Nevertheless, the idea of the existence of a 
paramount law that governs all social existence was born. 
19 Andrews, above, 15. 
20 Heinrich A Rommen (ed) The Natural Law (1 ed, Vail-Ballou Press, New York, 1947) 6. 
21 Sheldon Garrett Ward (ed) The History of Political Theory - Ancient Greece to Modern 
America (1 ed, Peter Lang, ew York, 1988) 23. 
22 Rommen, above, 16. 
23 Sir Paul Yinogradoff ( ed) Outlines of Historical Jurisprudence (Vol. ff) - The Jurisprudence of 
the Greek City (1 ed, Oxford University Press, London, 1922) 42. 
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The Stoics in Greece and later in Rome developed the idea of a natural 
law on this philosophical base further and conferred upon natural law binding 
authority and sanctions. 24 
2 The Scholastics and Thomas Aquinas 
In the middle ages, the Scholastics (9th to 15
th century) and Thomas 
Aquinas (1225-1274) regarded the natural law as divine in its origins and 
rationally determined as far as it concerned God's rational creatures (human 
beings). Thus, natural law was the participation of eternal law in human beings. 
As natural law was present in all of God's creatures, and men tended, 
understandably, to act in conformity with their nature, they were automatically 
obliged to obey the natural law.25 In so doing, the Scholastics brought natural law 
and God closer together. 26 
This interpretation of natural law corresponded to the common 
understanding of the relationship between God and human beings in the 
Christian theology in these times. However, despite the fact that the rise of 
Christianity had displaced the Stoics, the existence of a natural law was never 
doubted. 
24 Marcus Tullius Cicero (106-43 B.C.) recapitulated the views of the Stoics and stated the 
following: 
There is in fact a true law - namely, right reason - which is in accordance with nature, applies to all 
men, and is unchangeable and eternal. By its commands this law summons men to the performance of 
their duties; by its prohibitions it restrains them from doing wrong .... To invalidate this law by human 
legislation is never morally right, nor is it permissible ever to restrict its operation, and to annul it is 
impossible. either the senate nor the people can absolve us from our obligation to obey this law, and it 
requires no Sextus Aleius to expound and interpret it. It will not lay down one rule at Rome and another 
at Athens, nor will it be one rule today and another tomorrow. But there will be one law, eternal and 
unchangeable, binding at all times upon all peoples; and there will be, as it were, one common master 
and ruler of men, namely God, who is the author of this law, its interpreter, and its sponsor. The man 
who will not obey it will abandon his better self, and , in denying the true nature of a man, will thereby 
suffer the severest of penalties, though he has escaped all the other consequences which men call 
punishment. 
Taken from: William Einwechter Natural Law - A Summary and Critique 
<http: //www.natreforrnassn.org/statesman/99/natlawcrit.html> (last accessed 31 October 2002). 
25 Thomas Aquinus Summa Theologica ( 1 a 2ae, qua e. 91, art. 1 and 2). 
Translation has been taken from: Alessandro Passerin d'Entreves (ed) Natural Law - An 
Introduction to Legal Philosophy (2 ed, Hutchison University Library, London, 1970) 43. 
26 Heinrich A Rommen (ed) The Natural Law (1 ed, Vail-Ballou Press, ew York, 1947) 47. 
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3 From Grotius and Hobbes to Locke and Rousseau 
With increasing disbelief in the omnipotence of the church during the 
Renaissance, the view of the Scholastics became questionable. Hugo Grotius 
(1583- 1645) and Samuel Pufendorf (1632- 1694) extracted God from natural law 
and thus created the theoretical basis of the modern, secular and constitutional 
State. 27 They were convinced that theology no longer possessed the power 
required to be the basis of social existence and made, at least in terms of natural 
law, the existence of God superfluous.28 Thomas Hobbes (1588- 1679) added in 
his pioneering work Leviathan (1651) another feature of natural law arguing that 
the primordial state of human beings is to be at war with one another. 29 Therefore 
state power is essential in order to protect men against themselves. 30 
As a consequence of these new approaches, the individual and the 
reasonable exercise of state power was centred in the considerations of the 
jurists. In the late 1 ih century the concept of natural law was restructured by 
John Locke (1632- 1704), and was regarded as a set of natural rights of the 
individual. As a result of these natural rights, Locke defined the extent of natural 
law limits on government in its relationship with individuals .31 In addition to this 
libertarian aspect of constitutionalism, he postulated procedural regularity. The 
relationship between the institutional components of government had to be based 
on natural law principles as well. 32 
27 William G Andrews (ed) Constitutions and Constitutionalism (1 ed, D van ostrand Company, 
ew York, 1961) 17. 
28 "Etiamsi daremus non esse Deum". 
Passerin d 'Entreves, above, 53. 
29 Thomas Hobbes Leviathan: 
During the time men li ve without a common power to keep them all in awe, they are in that condition 
which is called war; and such a war as is of every man against every man 
Taken from: <http: //www.xrefer.com/entry/248580> (last accessed 31 October, 2002). 
30 "Homo hornini lupus est". 
Howard Warrender (ed) The Political Philosophy of Hobbes (1 ed, Oxford University Press, 
London, 1957) 48. 
31 Homepage of the Stanford University Constitutionalism 
<http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/constitutionalism> (last accessed 31 October 2002). 
32 William G Andrews (ed) Constitutions and Constitutionalism (1 ed, D van Nostrand Company, 
New York, 1961) 18. 
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The two principles of proscribed power and prescribed procedures are the 
two pillars modem constitutionalism was built upon. 33 
The last relevant progressive thinker towards constitutionalism was Jean-
Jacques Rousseau (1712-1778), who created the idea of a social contract (1762) 
between the people and the state. He developed Locke's theory by Hobbes' 
method further and conferred sovereignty to the people. 34 
4 Conclusion 
The first intellectual achievement of natural law was the cognition that 
there is a paramount order, which governs the social existence of all human 
beings. Due to this precondition, Pufendorf, Grotius and Locke were able to 
develop the idea of natural individual rights. The second intellectual achievement 
leading to constitutionalism was that State power was regarded as essential to 
enable the people to exercise their individual rights unhindered. 
Considering the notation of constitutionalism as the limitation of 
government, it has been developed by both approaches to a similar extent. 
Government and state power are necessary to guarantee the greatest possible 
exercise of individual rights. In turn, both have to be limited by the greatest 
possible exercise of individual rights. 
In all government there is a perpetual intestine struggle, open or secret, between 
Authority and Liberty, and neither of them can ever absolutely prevail in the 
contest. A great sacrifice of liberty must necessarily be made in every government; 
yet even the authority which confines liberty can never, and perhaps ought never, in 
any constitution to become quite entire and uncontrollable .... It must be owned 
that liberty is the perfection of civil society, but still authority must be 
acknowledged essential to its very existence. 35 
33 John Locke Second Treatise Chapter 4, Para 21: 
Freedom of men under government is to have a standing rule to live by, common to every one of that 
society, and made by the legislative power vested in it ; a liberty to follow my own will in all things, 
when the rule prescribes not, and not to be subject to the inconstant, unknown, arbitrary will of another 
man. 
Taken from: <http://www.constitution.org/cs_basic.htrn> (last accessed 31 October, 2002). 
34 Kenneth Clinton Wheare (ed) Modern Constitutions (2 ed, Oxford University Press, London, 
1966)33. 
35 David Hume ( 1711-1776), Scottish philosopher, historian and national economist. 
Taken from: Scott Gordon ( ed) Controlling the State - Constitutionalism from Ancient Athens to 
Today ( 1 ed, Harvard University Press, London, I 999) V. 
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B Consensus and Constitutionalism 
The development of natural law has paved the way for modem 
constitutionalism. However, as natural law, as understood by Locke and 
Rousseau, regarded the people as the original and actual authority in each state, 
the establishment of a new state order governed by a constitution in the modem 
sense required consensus among the people in this regard. 36 
As a consequence, the workability of constitutionalism demands three 
areas of consensus. 37 Firstly and most important, the people have to agree on the 
establishment of state power in general. They must share the view that the state is 
supposed to promote or protect the common interests of the members of a 
political community and is preferable to any other alternative. If the desirability 
of the survival of the State breaks down, a civil war or a revolution is the likely 
result. 38 Secondly, consensus on the respective form of the institutions, 
procedures and general aims of society is required. In the end, agreement must 
exist on the desirability of the rule of law as the basis of the respective 
government. 
The new sovereign, replacing the competing centres of power of the 
middle ages and the absolute monarchs of the 1 ih and 18th century, was the 
people. Therefore, the proper functioning of constitutions and the feasibility of 
constitutionalism are dependent on the agreement of the people.39 This was, in 
tum, a result of the development of natural law. 
C Constitutions and Constitutionalism 
The step from constitutionalism to the first constitutions was not 
significant anymore. As a result of the transfer of authority to the people by 
natural law, the mass of the governed gained new self-confidence. The American 
36 AW Bradley and K D Ewing (eds) Constitutional and Administrative law (11 ed, Longman, 
London, 1993) 3. 
37 William G Andrews (ed) Constitutions and Constitutionalism (I ed, D van Nostrand Company, 
ew York, 1961) 12/13. 
38 For example the United States in 1776, France in 1789 and in Russia 1917. 
39 Suri Ratnapala The Idea of a Constitution and Why Constitutions Matter 
<http://www.cis.org.au/Policy/SummOO/SummOO-l .pdf> (last accessed 31 October 2002). 
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Revolution in 1776 and the French Revolution in 1789 were the most obvious 
indications of the fact that the people were no longer willing to accept absolutist 
state order. 40 
By the time they had overthrown the old totalitarian rule, it became useful 
to inscribe the limits and procedures believed by them to be imposed by natural 
law on the governors. The first constitutions were intended to make the directives 
of the governed to the governors concrete and explicit, as well as to provide 
standards against which the governors had to measure their performance and 
could be measured by the governed. 41 Thus, the writtenness of the first 
constitutions can partly be explained by practical reasons. 
The first constitutions embodied in one single document emerged in some 
states of the United States of America.42 Nevertheless, the Constitution of the 
United States was and is always regarded as the first constitution in the modern 
sense. The next state that set in force a constitution was France, after the French 
Revolution in 1789. Due to the confusion in France during the aftermath of the 
revolution, there were enacted several successive constitutions in the 1790's.
43 
Constitutionalism became widely accepted at the beginning of the 18
th century 
and many European states, with the exception of England, moved on to enact 
constitutions.44 
IV CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF GERMANY AND NEW ZEALAND 
This chapter illustrates both the German and New Zealand path to their 
current constitutions. The term constitutional history is often used in a 
misleading way, as according to the general development of constitutions and 
constitutionalism, one cannot speak of constitutions in a narrower sense before 
the establishment of the United States' constitution in 1787. Admittedly this 
4° Kenneth Clinton Wheare (ed) Modern Constitutions (2 ed, Oxford University Press, London, 
1966) 34. 
41 William G Andrews (ed) Constitutions and Constitutionalism (1 ed, D van ostrand Company, 
New York, 1961) 21. 
42 Konstitutionalismus (Constitutionalism)<http://www20.wissen.de/xt/default.do> (last accessed 
31 October 2002). 
43 CF Strong (ed) Modern Political Constitutions (3 ed, Sidgwick & Jackson, London, 1949) 
35/36. 
44 Konstitutionalismus (Constitutionalism), above. 
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statement is more relevant to Germany than New Zealand, as the constitutional 
history of New Zealand only began with the signing of the Treaty of Waitangi in 
1840. Nevertheless, many predecessors of the BL in German legal history 
referred to the first two meanings of constitutions provided above. 
A The Path to the German Basic Law of 1949 
German legal history can be traced back to the law of the Roman 
Empire.45 Because one can only speak of constitutional law where state 
organization and/or individual rights are concerned, the first relevant documents 
date from the 14th century. As individual rights were not yet developed and 
intended to become part of constitutions only in the late 17
th century,46 the 
earliest documents concerning constitutional law all dealt with the organization 
of certain parts of the state. 
1 Legal sources in the Holy Roman Reich of German Nations 
The first legal sources of German constitutionalism can be found in the 
Holy Roman Reich of German Nations, which began with the coronation of Otto 
I in 962 and ended with the abdication of Franz II in 1806.
47 Noteworthy also is 
the so-called Sachsenspieget48, which summarized the then existing commonly 
approved law.49 Although it was only a legal book and not law, it contributed 
significantly to the development of rules for the king's election, which were 
formally enacted in the Goldene Bulle of 1356.
50 The Goldene Bulle was the first 
45 It has to be mentioned that the term 'Germany' has never been the official name for the 
different political communities in the 'German' history. To simplify matters, the author will 
nevertheless use this term for the rest of the paper.. 
46 See above. 
47 Anke Freckmann and Thomas Wegerich (eds) The German legal System (1 ed, Sweet & 
Maxwell, London, 1999) 5. 
48 Written by Eike von Repgow around 1220. 
49 A comprehensive evaluation of the Sachsenspiegel is provided in: Karl Gottfried Hugelmann 
( ed) Stiimme, Nation und Nationalstaat im Deutsch en Mittelalter (Tribes, Nations and National 
States in the German Middle Ages) (1 ed, W Kohlhammer, Wiirzburg, 1955) 14-23. 
50 Hermann Conrad ( ed) Deutsche Rechtsgeschichte - Friihzeit und Mittelalter (German legal 
histo,y - The Early Times and the Middle Ages) (1 ed, CF Muller, Karlsruhe, 1954) 306. 
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relevant document and laid down for the first time the principles of the 
Konigswahlrecht51 in a written body of law. It remained the authoritative basis of 
the king's election and was the most important constitutional law until the end of 
the Reich in 1806. 52 
Over the following centuries the power of the German emperor declined 
more and more as his sovereignty was gradually transferred to the different 
Landesherren53 . Furthermore, with the Renaissance, humanism and the 
Reformation, the state system's basis of medieval understandings of the 
relationship between the church and the state, became questionable. 54 
Consequently the constitutional order of the Holy Roman Reich of German 
Nations had to be challenged. Both the Augsburger Religionsfrieden55 and the 
Westfalischer Frieden56 reorganized parts of the German state order, and could 
therefore be regarded as the next relevant predecessors of the BL. 
The Peace of Augsburg acknowledged the Lutheran and Catholic 
religions as being equal and introduced the important principle of cuius regio 
eius religio, which meant that each national sovereign was entitled to determine 
his subject's religion in his territory, and that followers of other religions had the 
right to leave the respective territory unharmed. 57 
The Peace of Westphalia formally terminated the Thirty Year War. 
Besides the fact that this peace treaty is regarded as the source of modem 
international law,58 it contained some constitutional amendments. Firstly, it 
confirmed explicitly the provisions of the Peace of Augsburg relating to the 
equality of both religions. Secondly, the right of non alignment was granted to 
5 1 Provisions for the law of succession to the throne 
52 Dietmar Willoweit (ed) Deutsche Verfassungsgeschichte - Vom Frankenreich bis zur 
Wiedervereinigung Deutschlands (German constitutional history - From the Salic-Frank empire 
to the reunification of Germany) (3 ed, C.H.Beck, Mi.inchen, 1997) 71. 
53 National sovereigns of vassals of the Reich. 
54 Gerhard Oestreich (ed) Neostoicism & The Early Modern State (l ed, Cambridge University 
Press, Cambridge, 1982) 140 et sqq. 
55 Peace of Augsburg (1555) . 
56 Peace of Westphalia ( 1648). 
57 Germany - A Country Study The Peace of Augsburg <http: //memory.loc.gov/cgi-
bin/query/r?frd/cstdy:@field(DOCID+deOO 18)> (last accessed 31 October 2002). 
58 Alfred Verdross and Bruno Simma (eds) Universelles Volkerrecht (Universal International 
law) (3 ed, Duncker & Humboldt, Berlin, 1984) 20. 
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the Reichsstiinde59, and thirdly the institute of itio in partes60 in religious affairs 
was recognized, which led to the division of the Reichstag61 into a Catholic and a 
Protestant assembly, and to the requirement of consent of both assemblies before 
. 1 . 62 passmg a reso ut10n. 
As the Holy Roman Reich of German Nations lasted more than 900 
years, this paper has examined only the most important constitutional documents 
of the era. It is not necessary to understand their contents or political impact, but 
it must be borne in mind that parts of the state organization were governed by 
written documents from 1356 onwards. 
2 The constitutions of the 'Lander' 
In the aftermath of the French Revolution and the break-up of the Holy 
Roman Reich of German Nations, Germany entered a phase of political 
upheaval. 63 After the victory over Napoleon, the Congress of Vienna (1815) 
redrew the map of Europe. The Deutscher Bund64 was established, which was a 
59 The Reichsstiinde were several important groups in society, like the Markgrafen, Pfalzgrafen 
or bishops, which had the right to sit and vote in the Reichstag and consequently participate in 
royal resolutions. 
Anke Freckmann and Thomas Wegerich (eds) Th e German Legal System (1 ed, Sweet & 
Maxwell, London, 1999) 8. 
60 ltio in partes means that the respective religious groups negotiated separately in the co,pus 
catholicorum and the corpus evangelicorum. The decisions reached had to be discussed 
afterwards . 
Heinrich Richard Schmidt Absolutismus und Aujklaerung - Vom christlichen Fundamentalismus 
zum Vernunftglauben (Absolutism and Enlightenment - From Christian fundam entalism to the 
believe in common sense) <http://www.hist.unibe.ch/schmidt/veroeffh/chronik.htm> (last 
accessed 31 October 2002) . 
61 The Reichstag (Imperial Diet) was the representation of the Reichsstiinde and was involved in 
the process of legislation in the Holy Roman Reich of German ations . 
Reichstag (Imperial Diet) <http ://www20.wissen.de/xt/default.do> (last accessed 31 October 
2002). 
62 Dietmar Willoweit (ed) Deutsche Ve,fassungsgeschichte - Vom Frankenreich bis zur 
Wiedervereinigung Deutschlands (German constitutional history- From the Salic-Frank empire 
to the reunification of Germany) (3 ed, C.H.Beck, Miinchen, 1997) 145. 
63 Germany did strictly speaking not exist at this stage of the German history. After the breakup 
of the Holy Roman Reich of German ations the Rheinbund (Confederation of the Rhine) was 
created on 12 July 1806, to which ultimately 16 German states adhered. 
Hans Planitz and Karl August Eckhardt (eds) Deutsche Rechtsgeschichte (German legal history) 
(2 ed, R. Spies & Co, Wien, 1961) 282-283 . 
64 The Gemian Confederation. 
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loose association of the individual sovereign Bundesstaaten.65 Despite the 
increasing number of national states in Europe, the hopes of many Germans for a 
free, unitary nation- state were not fulfilled. 66 However, in relation to the 
development of constitutions, the Congress of Vienna can be seen as a crucial 
trigger, as it adopted in the Wiener Bundesakte67 an obligation upon all German 
States to pass their own constitutions. 68 Consequently, the first written 
constitutions in accordance with the ideas of constitutionalism emerged in the 
respective German States after the Congress. 
Between 1814 and 1832 eighteen German States introduced a 
constitution.69 Although the legitimacy of the monarchy was not questioned, the 
government was now legally bound by these constitutions. All of them contained 
basic rights, the separation of powers, a two-chamber system and elected 
representatives. Furthermore, the principles of Grundsatz der gesetzmassigen 
Verwaltung70 and nulla poena sine lege71 were enacted. In relation to individual 
rights, the rights of liberty as expressed in both the American Constitution and 
the French Declaration of Human and Political Liberty had been partly inserted, 
whereas the principle of equality was omitted.72 
65 Federal States. 
As the German Confederation was a confederation and not a federal state the term Bundesstaaten 
is misleading. The exact notation would have been 'Member state of the German Confederation '. 
Homepage of the University ofFreiburg Der Deutsche Bund (The German Confederation) 
<http://www2.ruf.uni-freiburg.de/philfak3/daf/projekte/wagner/wagn503.htm1> (last accessed 31 
October 2002). 
To simplify matters, the term 'German States ' will be used in the following. 
66 Homepage of the German embassy in Washington DC History of Germany 
<http: //www.germany-info.org/relaunch/info/facts/facts_ about/02 _ 05 .html> (last accessed 31 
October 2002) . 
67 Federal File of Vienna. 
68 Anke Freckmann and Thomas Wegerich (eds) The German l egal System (1 ed, Sweet & 
Maxwell, London, 1999) 20. 
69 For example: Nassau (1814); Bavaria, Baden, Hanover (1818); Wilrttemberg (1819) ; Hesse-
Darmstadt (1820); Saxony, Kurhesse (1831); Braunschweig (1832) . 
Hannsjoachim Wolfgang Koch (ed) A constitutional history of Gennany (1 ed, Longman Group, 
Essex, 1984) 3. 
70 The principle of lawful administration. 
71 o penalty without law. 
72 The acknowledged rights of liberty in the mentioned documents were the following : personal 
freedom (abolition of slavery), freedom of property (abolition of lord manor 's power) freedom of 
settlement ( dissolution of corporate bindings), freedom of commerce and economy ( abolition of 
the obligation to be in guilds), abolition of the right to banish tradesman), freedom of marriage 
( abolition of marriage restrictions), freedom of faith and of conscience, freedom of press and 
associations. 
Anke Freckmann and Thomas Wegerich (eds) The German l egal System (1 ed, Sweet & 
Maxwell, London, 1999) 22. 
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3 The German Reich Constitution of 1849 ('Frankfurter 
Pauls kirchen- Verfassung ') 
The next important step was the Paulskirchenverfassung of 1849, which 
was drafted as a consequence of the so-called 1848 revolution in Germany. 73 
After the foundation of the German Confederation in 1815, reactionary forces 
came to the fore again and hampered movements of the German population 
towards a unified German state and its long- lasting struggle for liberty, equality 
and participation in the law-making process. In contrast to the revolution of 
1789, the French revolution of February 1848, and the proclamation of the 
French Republic, triggered immediate responses in Germany. In March, there 
were uprisings in all states that forced many concessions from the stunned 
. 1 . 74 natlona sovereigns. 
Apparently, constitutionalism could not be held back anymore. The 
Deutsche verfassungsgebende Nationalversammlung75 was elected by each male, 
adult, independent citizen, and was intended to arrange a German constitution for 
a unified Germany resting on the idea of liberty and equality.76 The National 
Assembly was composed of approximately 700 deputies from all German States 
and convened for the first time at St. Paul's Church in Frankfurt/Main on 18 May 
1848.77 After some hard bargaining, a democratic constitution was submitted on 
28 March 1849, which attempted to combine old and new ideas. According to 
this constitution, Germany was intended to be a federal constitutional monarchy 
with a monarch who was responsible to Parliament. Furthermore, this 
constitution contained a catalogue of individual rights. 78 Due to the complex 
political situation and the fact that the National Assembly had never been 
73 Germany - A Country Study The Revolutions of 1848 <http://memory.loc.gov/cgi-
bin/query/r?frd/cstdy:@field(DOCID+de0024)> (last accessed 31 October 2002). 
74 Dietmar Willoweit (ed) Deutsche Ve,fassungsgeschichte - Vom Frankenreich bis zur 
Wiedervereinigung Deutschlands (German constitutional history - From the Salic-Frank empire 
to the reunification of Germany) (3 ed, C.H.Beck, Milnchen, 1997) 234. 
75 German Constituent ational Assembly. 
76 Marc Phillip Analyse und Vergleich der deutschen Wahlsysteme zwischen 1800 und J 949 
(Analysis and Comparison of German election systems between 1800 and 1949) 
<http://www.hausarbeiten.de/rd/archiv/politologie/po1-text404.shtml> (last accessed 31 October 
2002). 
77 Hannsjoachim Wolfgang Koch (ed) A constitutional history of Germany (1 ed, Longman 
Group, Essex, 1984) 58. 
78 Elmar M Hucko (ed) The Democratic Tradition - Four German Constitutions (1 ed, St. 
Martin 's Press, ew York, 1987) 12 et seqq. 
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conferred the power to enforce the Paulskirchenverfassung, it never became 
effective. 79 
The I 848 revolution failed in terms of enacting a state order based on the 
ideas of constitutionalism.80 Nevertheless, the first real German constitution had 
an important influence on future constitutional discussions and was in some 
respects more progressive than its direct successor, the Bismarck'sche 
Reichsverfassung. As the members of the National Assembly were 
democratically elected and the turnout was about 60 per cent, the 
Paulskirchenverfassung was democratically even more legitimate than all three 
of its successors. 81 
4 The Bismarck 'sche Reichsverfassung of I 87 I 
In the following years, Prussia was able to enlarge its position m the 
German Confederation for two main reasons. Firstly, the downturn of Austrian 
influence in Germany and secondly, the clever politics of the chancellor, Otto 
von Bismarck (1815- 1898).82 After several wars,83 the disbanding of the German 
Confederation and the short existence of the Norddeutscher Bund, 84 Bismarck 
achieved his main aim, the unification of all German States. In 1871, the 
79 One major problem of this time the ational Assembly has never resolved was whether Austria 
should be attached to the Gemrnn Reich (the question of a greater or little Gemrnny). 
Sabine Michalowski and Loma Woods (eds) German Constitutional Law (1 ed, Dartmouth 
Publishing Company Limited, Aldershot, 1999) 3. 
80 A comprehensive analysis of reasons for the failure of the 1848 revolution is provided in: 
Koch, above, 73-77. 
81 Dietrnar Willoweit (ed) Deutsche Ve,fassungsgeschichte - Vom Frankenreich bis zur 
Wiedervereinigung Deutsch lands (German constitutional history - From the Salic-Frank empire 
to the reunification of Germany) (3 ed, C.H.Beck, Milnchen, 1997) 237/239 . 
82 www.amrnermann.de Grundung des Norddeutschen Bundes (Foundation of the North German 
Confederation) <http: //www.amrnemrnnn.de/norddeutscherbund.htrn> (last accessed 31 October 
2002). 
83 Gemrnn Confederation- Denmark 1864; Austria- Prussia 1866; Gemrnny- France 1870/71. 
84 orth Gemrnn Confederation. 
It existed between 1867-71 and was an alliance of 22 German States north of the Main River. 
Dominated by Prussia, it replaced the German Confederation and included the states that had 
supported Prussia in the Austro-Prussian War (1866). The South German states, notably Bavaria, 
Baden, Wilrttemberg, and the grand duchy of Hesse, though excluded from the confederation, 
were nevertheless closely bound to it through several alliances guaranteeing mutual protection. 
www.fundus.org 1862 - 1871 Von Bismarck!Preussen forcierte Reichseinigung (1862 - 1871 
The unification of the Reich pushed by Bismarck/Prussia) 
<http://www.fundus.org/pdf.asp?ID=8777> (last accessed 31 October 2002). 
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Deutsches Reich85 was eventually founded without Austria and a predominant 
position of Prussia. 86 
Although the Bismarck'sche Reichsverfassung of 1871 is often regarded 
as the second important German constitution, this constitution is based 
completely on the constitution of the North German Confederation.87 This 
constitution was created by Bismarck and designed for his political ideas for the 
future of the German Reich.88 The Bismarck'sche Reichsverfassung was only a 
lightly amended version of the constitution of the North German Confederation 
and came into force on 4 May 1871. 89 
The Paulskirchenverfassung and the Bismarck 'sche Reichsverfassung 
differed on some significant points. The latter only regulated the organization of 
the state and did not contain a catalogue of basic rights. 90 Additionally, it was not 
drafted by a constituent National Assembly like its predecessor of 1848, but 
rather by the Imperial Diet, which, though it was democratically legitimated, was 
not so to a comparable extent. Of further interest is that the Bismarck 'sche 
Reichsverfassung established the German Reich of 1871 as a Federal State 
consisting of 25 Federal states and consequently accomplished the longed for 
German unity. However, the unity never came about by popular decision from 
below but rather by a treaty between national sovereigns from above.91 
For the reasons explored, Bismarck's constitution is often regarded as a 
step backwards in German constitutional history. Bismarck succeeded in 
suppressing progressive forces by political means, legally justified by his 
constitution. Unfortunately, a cruel war had to occur to push German 
constitutional development once again. 
85 German Empire. 
86 For example: Prussia 's king was the hereditary emperor and his appointed prime minister was 
acting as the Reichskanzler (Imperial Chancellor) . 
Elrnar M Hucko (ed) The Democratic Tradition - Four German Constitutions (1 ed, St. Martin 's 
Press, New York, 1987) 28 et seqq. 
87 This constitution was accepted by the Imperial Diet on 16 April 1867. 
Hannsjoachim Wolfgang Koch (ed) A constitutional histo,y of Germany (1 ed, Longman Group, 
Essex, 1984) 113. 
88 Anke Freckmann and Thomas Wegerich (eds) The German Legal System (1 ed, Sweet & 
Maxwell, London, 1999) 19. 
89 Koch, above, 122. 
90 Sabine Michalowski and Loma Woods (eds) German Constitutional Law (1 ed, Dartmouth 
Publishing Company Limited, Aldershot, 1999) 3. 
91 Homepage of the German embassy in Washington DC History of Germany 
<http: //www.germany-info.org/relaunch/info/facts/facts _ about/02 _ 05 .html> (last accessed 31 
October 2002). 
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5 The Weimarer Reichsverfassung of I 9 I 9 
After the German Reich had been defeated in World War I (1914-1918) 
and allied governments had refused to enter peace negotiations with the German 
Emperor Wilhelm II, he declared his abdication and the Weimar Republic was 
proclaimed on 9 November 1918. Monarchy had eventually lost all credibility in 
Germany and the way was paved for the Weimarer Reichsverfassung. A new 
National Assembly was elected in January 1919 and convened for the first time 
in Weimar on 6 February 1919 in order to draft a new constitution and thus 
prevent a further political deadlock. 92 
Finally, the Versailler Friedensvertrag93 empowered Germany to refom1 
its internal relations and the Weimarer Reichsverfassung was passed within the 
Reichstag on 31 July 1919. This constitution contained both a catalogue of basic 
rights and a part dealing with state organization in the broadest sense. It laid 
down the political system of a parliamentary federal republic with, in comparison 
to the Bismarck'sche Reichsverfassung, a large emphasis on the centralization of 
political power. 94 Interesting, especially for New Zealand, is the introduction of a 
proportional electoral system, whose main features were adopted by the Federal 
Electoral Law of 1956 and served as the basis of New Zealand ' s Mixed-
Member- Proportional System (MMP) first applied in the 1996 election. 95 
At that time, the Weimarer Reichsverfassung was one of the most 
progressive constitutions, but its progressiveness was unfortunately one of the 
reasons for the ruin of the Weimar Republic after only 14 years. 96 The new 
constitution did not provide the necessary means to cope with post-war economic 
92 Herny M Pachter ( ed) Modern Germany- A Social, Cultural, and Political History ( 1 ed, 
Westview Press, Boulder, 1978) 90. 
93 Peace Treaty of Versailles . 
It was signed on June 28, 1919, by Germany and by the Allies (save Russia) and formally 
terminated World War I. Besides many other points, the treaty placed responsibility for the war 
on Germany and its allies and imposed on Germany the burden of the reparations payments . 
Germany - A Country Study World Warf <http: //memory.loc.gov/cgi-
bin/query/r?frd/cstdy:@field(DOCID+de0028)> (last accessed 31 October 2002). 
94 Sabine Michalowski and Lorna Woods (eds) German Constitutional Law (1 ed, Dartmouth 
Publishing Company Limited, Aldershot, 1999) 3. 
95 This election marked ew Zealand 's a first major departure from the Westminster system. 
Geoffrey Palmer and Matthew Palmer (eds) Bridled Power (3 ed, Oxford University Press, 
Auckland, 1997) 11 . 
96 Elmar M Hucko (ed) The Democratic Tradition - Four German Constitutions (1 ed, St. 
Martin 's Press, New York, 1987) 56. 
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misery, the oppressive terms of the Treaty of Versailles97 or the world economic 
crisis of 1929, because it was in some ways too liberal and in other ways too easy 
to manipulate. 
Two important characteristics of the constitution exemplify this 
allegation. The first feature was the unlimited admission of political parties to the 
Reichstag: the constitution did not provide any threshold. As unemployment, 
general recession and domestic instability generated the upcoming of radical 
parties, many right and left wing parties emerged and obtained seats in the 
Reichstag. In consequence, the Reichstag consisted of too many different parties, 
obstructing its workability significantly, and the development and spread of 
radical parties was further supported. 98 The inability of the Reichstag to act led 
inevitably to the second important feature of the constitution, as this incapacity 
was more and more compensated by Article 48(2). This provision conferred the 
Reichspraesident99 the right of emergency decrees if public peace and order or 
public security were threatened. As the decision to act was a matter of 
Presidential discretion, the democratic factor was almost completely removed, 
and the exercise of state power became manipulable. According to many 
scholars, this particular combination of constitutional provisions enabled non-
democratic parties and politicians to misuse the system and therefore prepared 
Germany for fascistic catastrophe and the Nazis. '00 This conclusion is of course 
simplified and the breakdown of the Weimar Republic resulting in the Third 
Reich was caused by many other components as well. However, a stricter 
constitution would have preserved the workability of the Reichstag and perhaps 
the Weimar Republic might have been able to cope with the existing problems 
without sliding into radicalism. 
In German constitutional history, the ideas of constitutionalism reached 
their peak in the Weimarer Reichsverfassung. Unfortunately, the constitution did 
not provide the means to cope with the circumstances. From today' s perspective, 
97 See above, n 93. 
98 Marc Phillip Analyse und Vergleich der deutschen Wahlsysteme zwischen 1800 und 1949 
(A nalysis and Comparison of German election systems between 1800 and 1949) 
<http://www.hausarbeiten.de/rd/archiv/politologie/pol-text404.shtml> (last accessed 31 October 
2002) . 
99 German President. 
100 Anke Freckmann and Thomas Wegerich (eds) The German l egal System (1 ed, Sweet & 
Maxwell, London, 1999) 26. 
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the Weimar Republic was not ripened for its liberal constitution as well as the 
challenges of the 1920's and therefore should be regarded as a "republic without 
republicans". 10 1 Notwithstanding its failure, the Weimarer Reichsverfassung is 
today considered the most liberal constitution Germany ever had. 
6 The German Basic Law of 1949 
After World War II and 12 years of complete disregard for basic rights 
and constitutional principles, the occupying powers governed Germany from 
1945 to 1949. 102 Their aims were the abolishment of National Socialism, the full 
disarming of Germany and the re-establishment of a constitution so the country 
could resume responsibility for its affairs. 103 In many respects, Germany was 
faced with the same problems as it was 25 years ago after World War I. The new 
German constitution was supposed to have taken into account the mistakes of its 
predecessor and therefore be able to cope with the difficult circumstances. 
(a) The development of the German Basic Law 
Due to the fact that the Western Allies 104 and the USSR pursued different 
objectives in relation to Germany, it became clear that a re- establishment of one 
Germany consisting of all four zones of occupation was not realizable. The 
policies of the Allies in order to reorganize Germany in their zone resembled 
those of the Peace of Augsburg (cuius regio, eius religio), as each occupying 
101 Homepage of the German embassy in Washington DC History of Germany 
<http: //www.germany-info.org/relaunch/info/facts/facts _ about/02 _ 05 .html> (last accessed 31 
October 2002). 
102 As between 1933 and 1945 Germany ceased to be a democratic and constitutional state, this 
part of German legal history is not relevant for the constitutional development at all. The only 
contribution of the azis to both German constitutionalism and the development of the BL was 
that each following constitution had to avoid such a catastrophe by all means. 
103 Homepage of the German embassy in Washington DC, above. 
104 USA, United Kingdom and France. 
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power pursued its own aims and only the Western Allies were able to find a 
· 105 compromise. 
In 1948, the Western Allies authorized the Minister Presidents of the 
newly established 11 West German La.nder106 to convene a constituent 
Parliamentary Council consisting of members of the Federal states 
Parliaments. 107 A committee of experts on constitutional questions 108 submitted a 
draft for a new constitution to the Parliamentary Council in August 1948 and 
finally, on 1 September the Parliamentary Council convened for the first time in 
Bonn. 109 This draft aimed mainly at avoiding the mistakes of the Weimarer 
Reichsverfassung firstly by restraining the powers of the head of state, secondly 
by establishing a constitutional court, and thirdly by emphasizing the federal 
structure of the state. 110 After tough negotiations between the members of the 
Parliamentary Council and the Allied Powers, a compromise was eventually 
found in April 1949 and on 23 May the BL came into force. 111 It was partly 
similar to the Paulskirchenverfassung and the Weimarer Reichsverfassung 
containing individual basic rights and constitutional civil rights. It organized the 
state according to constitutional principles. 112 
105 Elmar M Hucko (ed) The Democratic Tradition - Four German Constitutions (l ed, St. 
Martin's Press, New York, 1987) 63. 
106 Federal states. As Germany was supposed to become a Federal State, the term 'Federal states' 
was this time justified. 
107 Hannsjoachim Wolfgang Koch (ed) A constitutional history of Germany (l ed, Longman 
Group, Essex, 1984) 338. 
108 Herrenchiemsee Constitutional Convention. 
109 Elmar M Hucko (ed) The Democratic Tradition - Four German Constitutions (l ed, St. 
Martin's Press, New York, 1987) 67. 
11° Klaus Kroeger "Die Entstehung des Grundgesetzes (The Development of the Basic Law)" 
(1989) 42 eue Juristische Wochenschau 1318, 1319. 
111 Sabine Michalowski and Loma Woods (eds) German Constitutional law (1 ed, Dartmouth 
Publishing Company Limited, Aldershot, 1999) 5. 
112 The Basic Law of the German Democratic Republic (GDR) became effective on 7 November 
1949 and was based on completely different principles. As the eastern part of Germany fell under 
the occupation of the Soviet Union, the GDR was established as a socialist state under a socialist 
legal and constitutional order. Although it is doubtless that the GDR is one of the most important 
parts of German history, its constitution did not contribute anything to the BL because of its 
socialistic background. It can therefore be neglected in this context. After signing the 
Einigungsvertrag (Treaty of Reunification) in 1990, the GDRjoined the Federal Republic of 
Germany under Article 23 BL, and its constitution was abrogated. 
Dietmar Willoweit (ed) Deutsche Verfassungsgeschichte - Vom Frankenreich bis zur 
Wiedervereinigung Deutsch lands (German constitutional history - From the Sahe-Frank empire 
to the reunification of Germany) (3 ed, CH.Beck, Mtinchen, 1997) 425 . 
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(b) The provisional character of the German Basic Law 
Another interesting feature of the BL is its provisional character. After 
World War II and several indications that Germany would be divided into two 
parts, the authorized Minister Presidents 11 3 were reluctant to create a real 
constitution for West Germany. In their opinion, a constitution specific to West 
Germany would have enhanced the partition of Germany. Accordingly, they tried 
to emphasize the provisional character of the West German State by creating 
only a provisional basic law rather than a constitution. The BL was only 
supposed to be an interim solution until Germany was unified again. 114 As the 
BL fulfilled all requirements of a real constitution, it was in the end only a 
formal distinction. 115 However, the idea of the creation of a mere provisional 
basic law generated a significant lack of democratic legitimisation of the BL. 11 6 
Originally, the Western Allies wanted the Minister Presidents to convene a freely 
elected constitutional assembly and not a parliamentary council. Likewise, in 
order to emphasize the provisional character of a West German constitution, the 
Minister Presidents convinced the Western powers that it would be more 
appropriate to avoid the classical way of creating a constitution and, least of all, 
make the enactment of a constitution subject to a referendum. 11 7 
In terms of democratic legitimisation, the BL was less in accordance with 
constitutionalism than its predecessor or the Paulskirchenverfassung. Perhaps the 
Fathers of the Basic Law feared another disaster and did not believe the German 
people capable of creating a reasonable constitution in a democratic way. 
11 3 See above. 
114 Hannsjoachim Wolfgang Koch ( ed) A constitutional history of Germany ( 1 ed, Longman 
Group, Essex, 1984) 339. 
11 5 Regarding the contents of the BL, only three provisions showed this provisional character and 
were amended after the German Reunification in 1990 (Preamble, Article 23 , Article 146). 
11 6 Donald P Kommers ( ed) The Constitutional Jurisprudence of the Federal Republic of 
Germany (1 ed, Duke University Press, Durham and London, 1989) 36. 
11 7 Sabine Michalowski and Loma Woods (eds) German Constitutional law (1 ed, Dartmouth 
Publishing Company Limited, Aldershot, 1999) 4. 
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(c) Conclusion 
Given the genesis of the BL and the fact that it had never been subject to 
the legitimisation of the people, some thought that after the reunification the time 
had come for the German people to give themselves, according to the old Article 
146 BL, a legitimised constitution. However, the majority of the Federal 
Parliament was opposed to such a project and therefore the appointed 
Constitutional Commission only made recommendations of amendments of the 
existing BL. 118 Consequently, the BL remained in force even after the 
reunification Germany. This means that the provisional character of the BL has 
come to an end and that it can now be regarded as the permanent constitution of 
the German state. 119 
7 Conclusion 
As illustrated in this chapter, the BL is the result of almost 800 years of 
constitutional history in Germany. Though denouncing its lack of democratic 
legitimisation, it has proved a reliable, durable and stable source for the last 53 
years coping with all social changes. It has incorporated historical experiences of 
all its predecessors and is today regarded as a constitution, conferring a 
maximum of individual rights combined with a state organization that allows a 
high level of workability. The well- balanced relationship between state and 
individual provided by the BL has converted conceptions of constitutionalism in 
a rather successful way. 
118 Dietmar Willoweit ( ed) Deutsche Verfassungsgeschichte - Vom Frankenreich bis zur 
Wiedervereinigung Deutsch lands (German constitutional history - From the Sa/ic-Frank empire 
to the reunification of Germany) (3 ed, CH.Beck, Milnchen, 1997) 426. 
119 Michalowski/Woods, above, 6. 
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The future development of the BL, especially regarding the European 
Union and the relationship between European law and German domestic law, 
remains to be seen. 120 
B The Development of New Zealand's Unwritten Constitution 
In 1840, the British Crown and Maori signed the Treaty of Waitangi 121 
that established New Zealand as a British colony and was therefore the 
foundation of sovereignty of the British Crown. It makes sense to refer to this 
signing as the starting point of New Zealand's constitutional history because the 
gaining of sovereignty entails, besides other things, the abolishment of all 
previous structures. 122 However, it has to be stressed that all previous customs or 
rules applied by the Maori were, as far as they were relevant, part of the Treaty, 
which is today regarded as a part of the New Zealand constitution. 123 
120 At the summit meeting of the Heads of State of the European Union Laeken (Belgium) on the 
14 th/15 th December 2001 the creation ofa European Convention was decided. It is supposed to 
propose a new framework and structures for the European Union, which are geared to changes in 
the world situation, the needs of the citizens of Europe and the future development of the 
European Union. Under the chairmanship of Valery Giscard d 'Estaing the Convention submitted 
a draft of a European Constitution on 28 October 2002 provided in the Appendix, part F. 
Taken from: Homepage of the European Convention <http://european-
convention.eu.int/bienvenue.asp?lang=EN> (last accessed 31 October 2002). 
12 1 Treaty ofWaitangi will be abbreviated in the following to 'Treaty'. 
122 As 'European New Zealand ' is a product of European development the English constitutional 
history prior 1840 can be regarded as part of the constitutional history of ew Zealand as well. 
Nevertheless, this paper begins its examination of ew Zealand 's constitutional history with the 
signing of the Treaty because of the incisive effect of the gaining of sovereignty. 
Regarding the relevance of the English constitutional history prior 1840, compare: 
FM Brookfield (ed) Waitangi and Indigenous Rights: Revolution, Law and Legitimation (1 ed, 
Auckland University Press, Auckland, 1999) 85 et seqq. 
A general description of the impact of the gaining of sovereignty on constitutional issues will be 
provided in the following chapter. 
123 Geoffrey Palmer (ed) Unbridled Power (2 ed, Oxford University Press, Auckland, 1987) 20. 
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I Establishment of British sovereignty 
From the landing in New Zealand by James Cook and his declaration of 
possession in 1769124 to the arrival of first British settlers in the 1820's, the 
Crown had no interest in New Zealand and refused to intervene in the settlement 
and affairs of the country at all. The Crown acknowledged this view in several 
statutes, passed in 1817, 1823 and 1828, which regarded New Zealand as being 
"not within His Majesty's dominion". 125 When New Zealand became attractive 
to foreign traders and conflicts occurred between Maori and British settlers, the 
Crown became willing to become involved in New Zealand affairs. The Crown 
appointed James Busby as British Resident in 1832 who, unfortunately, was not 
able to reduce the violence between Maori and British settlers. In order to avoid 
the painful experiences in other colonies caused by lawlessness and to get in 
ahead of the French, who also had an intention to annex New Zealand, the Crown 
decided in January 183 9 to acquire sovereignty over New Zealand on the basis of 
consent with the Maori. 126 
The first step towards this aim was through the Letters Patent issued on 
15 June 1839 purporting to extend the boundaries of New South Wales to include 
"any territory which is or may be acquired ... within that group of islands ... 
known as New Zealand". 127 This Letters Patent did not have any legal effect, and 
in July 1839, Captain William Hobson was appointed Lieutenant- Governor over 
New Zealand and commissioned to negotiate with Maori for recognition of 
C · 128 rown sovereignty. 
Hobson arrived in the Bay of Islands on 29 January 1840. After only 
eight days, he and some 50 northern Maori chiefs signed the Treaty on 6 
124 Actually, James Cook was not the fust European who discovered New Zealand. It was rather 
the Dutch Abel Tasman who discovered New Zealand already in 1642. As he did not put ashore 
or made any symbolic act towards claiming ew Zealand in the name of the etherlands, today 
James Cook is regarded as the discoverer of ew Zealand. 
Homepage of the Ulster Museum Magni Captain Cook and the discove,y of New Zealand 
<http://www.ulstermuseum.org.uk/gardenflora/cook.htm> (last accessed 31 October 2002). 
125 Claudia Orange (ed) The Treaty of Waitangi (1 ed, Allen & Unwin, Wellington, 1987) 8. 
126 NA Foden ( ed) New Zealand legal History (1642 to J 842) (1 ed, Sweet & Maxwell, 
Wellington, 1965) 17. 
127 Morag McDowell and Duncan Webb (eds) Th e New Zealand Legal System (2 ed, 
Butterworths, Wellington, 1998) 102. 
128 Philip A Joseph (ed) Constitutional and Administrative Law in New Zealand (2 ed, Brookers, 
Wellington, 2001) 36. 
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February. After the Treaty was circulated around New Zealand for further 
signatures, Hobson issued on 21 May 1840 two proclamations of British 
sovereignty over New Zealand. Sovereignty over the North Island was 
proclaimed by way of cession and over the South Island on the grounds of 
Cook's discovery. On 2 October 1840, the British government ratified and 
gazetted the proclamations and it is this date the New Zealand courts have 
acknowledged as the date the British acquired sovereignty over New Zealand. 
Although Britain would probably not have established British rule without the 
free consent of Maori, New Zealand was in the following years treated more as a 
colony acquired by settlement than one by cession. 129 
In order to illustrate the importance of the gaining of sovereignty to the 
constitutional development of a country, the following general definition of 
sovereignty is worth considering. Sovereignty means, in international law terms, 
that the holder of sovereign power is entitled to absolute power (to make and to 
enforce laws). It also means that any changes to those powers can only be 
exercised by the holder of sovereign power. Finally, it means that the right to 
ownership of the respective territory is imported. 13° Consequently, British laws 
became directly applicable to New Zealand and it was therefore Imperial 
Legislation 131 that left its mark on the first centuries of New Zealand's 
constitutional history. Thus, the establishment of British sovereignty was crucial 
to the development of New Zealand's constitutional system and has set the 
course even until today. 
2 Government between 1840 and 1852 
Letters Patent ('the Charter') of 16 November 1840 established a 
constitutional framework in New Zealand. Most important was the creation of a 
Legislative Council, which was an appointed body and was conferred the power 
129 Philip A Joseph "The Legal History and Framework of the Constitution" in Colin James (ed) 
Building the Constitution (1 ed, Brebner Print, Wellington, 2000) 168, 176. 
130 Alfred Verdross and Bruno Simma (eds) Universelles Volkerrecht (Universal International 
Law) (3 ed, Duncker & Humboldt, Berlin, 1984) 29. 
13 1 Imperial legislation includes statutes of the Parliaments of Great Britain, England and the 
United Kingdom. The abbreviation 'Imp ' after the name of an Act indicates that the statute is 
Imperial legislation. 
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to make "[)Jaws and Ordinances as may be required for the Peace, Order and 
good Government of New Zealand". Nevertheless, the Legislative Council was 
restricted, as any legislation had to be in conformity with Imperial legislation, 
submitted to the Imperial Parliament, and subject to royal affirmation. Therefore, 
the final control remained in Great Britain. Hobson was officially appointed as 
Governor of New Zealand on 24 November 1840. Due to the distance from 
London, it became apparent that the Governor had considerable autonomy and, 
despite the existence of the Legislative Council, he, in negotiation with the 
British Colonial Office, ran the colony. 132 
In the following years, the autocratic style of government and disputes 
over sales of Maori land became an issue of concern for the settlers and led them 
to petition the British government to make further provisions for the government 
of New Zealand. In response to these petitions, the Imperial Parliament passed in 
1846 the Act of the Constitution of Government in the New Zealand Islands 
(Constitution Act 1846 (Imp)), which established representative institutions but 
required the then Governor George Grey to bring it into effect. 133 Unfortunately, 
Grey did not believe that settlers should be accorded this degree of self-
government and consequently, he failed to adapt the system of representative 
government. 134 Quite the contrary, he petitioned the Secretary of State in London 
to suspend the new Charter and the Act was repealed in 1848. Thus, the 
Legislative Council was revived and autocratic rule continued until 1852. 135 
3 Establishment of responsible government 
Notwithstanding the repeal of the Constitution Act 1846 (Imp), 
constitutional ideas could no longer be stopped. In 1852, the British Parliament 
132 Morag McDowell and Duncan Webb (eds) The New Zealand Legal System (2 ed, 
Butterworths, Wellington, 1998) I 03 . 
133 Philip A Joseph (ed) Constitutional and Administrative law in New Zealand (2 ed, Brookers, 
Wellington, 2001) 114. 
134 Actually, Governor Grey refused to adapt the system, as he always wanted to strengthen the 
authority of the Executive. 
PG McHugh "The Historiography of ew Zealand 's Constitutional History" in Philip A Joseph 
(ed) E say on the Constitution (I ed, Brookers, Wellington, 1995) 344, 350 
135 McDowell/Webb, above, 104. 
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passed the New Zealand Constitution Act 1852 (Imp). 136 As this statute brought 
together some important constitutional issues such as the implementation of a 
representative Parliament, a description of the relationship between the 
respective state institutions and a measure of superior law status, it can be 
regarded as New Zealand's first constitution. 137 
Nevertheless, as this act still depended m some respects on Imperial 
legislation, full legal independence from the Crown was not yet achieved. The 
General Assembly, for example, was granted the power to make laws and 
ordinances for the peace, order and good government of New Zealand, but on the 
condition that no such laws were repugnant to the laws of England. 138 Another 
example of this dependence was the limited superior law status of the Act, which 
meant that certain amendments required assent from the Crown. However, 
although large parts of the 1852 Act were repealed, it remained the basis of New 
Zealand's constitution until 1986. 139 
After this, the bond to the Crown and Imperial legislation was more 
clearly defined by the adoption of the English Laws Acts 1854, 1858, and 1908 
(NZ). These Acts stated that all laws in existence in England on 14 January 1840 
were to be applied in New Zealand. Thus, New Zealand inherited not only 
aspects of the British legal and constitutional systems, but also common and 
statute law. The Colonial Laws Validity Act 1865 (Imp) eventually granted some 
limited legal independence, as colonial Parliaments were allowed to pass laws 
inconsistent with British laws as long as these laws were not incompatible with 
an Imperial statute that was specifically applicable to a particular colony. 140 
Despite all independence, the New Zealand Parliament was clearly legally 
subordinate to the Crown until 194 7. 141 
136 Geoffrey Palmer The Legal History and Framework of the New Zealand Constitution 
<http: //www.chenpalm.co.nz/cpopinion4 .asp?mID=17> (last accessed 3 1 October 2002). 
137 McDowell/Webb, above, 104. 
138 Raymond Douglas Mulholland (ed) Introduction to the New Zealand Legal System (10 ed, 
Butterworths, Wellington, 2001) 34. 
139 The requirement of assent by the Crown to amend the Act was altered in 1857, when the 
General Assembly was given limited powers to amend it without referring to the Crown. 
However, full legal autonomy was not yet achieved. 
Geoffrey Palmer and Matthew Palmer (eds) Bridled Power (3 ed, Oxford University Press, 
Auckland, 1997) 4. 
140 Peter Spiller, Jeremy Finn, Richard Boast (eds) New Zealand Legal Histo,y (2 ed, Brookers, 
Wellington, 2001) 76. 
141 Geoffrey Palmer "The Legal Framework of Constitution" in Colin James (ed) Building the 
Constitution ( 1 ed, Brebner Print, Wellington, 2000) 182, 187. 
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4 Moves towards legal and constitutional independence 
In 1931, the Statute of Westminster (Imp) granted the parliaments of 
Australia, New Zealand, Ireland and Newfoundland full power to create statutes 
having extra territorial effect, and repealed the Colonial Laws Validity Act 1865 
(Imp) formally. Furthermore, section 2 of the Statute stated that no Act passed by 
the parliament of a dominion could be deemed void because it was repugnant to 
the laws of England. 142 Finally, Britain showed a willingness to separate itself 
from the legal affairs of its colonies. Regarding New Zealand, two further 
provisions were of importance. First, section 8 of the Statute expressly confirmed 
the New Zealand Constitution Act 1852 (Imp) and all subsequent amendments, 
which meant that, due to the entrenched provisions, the New Zealand General 
Assembly was precluded from altering their constitution unless it would invoke 
the request and consent procedure provided by the Statute of Westminster 1931. 
In addition, the Statute was not to apply in New Zealand without being adopted 
by the New Zealand Parliament. 143 
Because of the loyalty of both New Zealand and Australia to the British 
Empire, they were generally reluctant to implement Britain's offer of legal 
autonomy, and it was only in 1947 that New Zealand adopted the Statute of 
Westminster through the enactment of the Statute of Westminster Adoption Act 
1947. 144 In the same year the British Parliament was requested, bys 8 of the 
Westminster Statute 1931, to grant to the New Zealand Parliament full power to 
repeal and amend its constitution in the New Zealand Constitution Amendment 
(Request and Consent) Act 1947. In response, the New Zealand Constitution 
(Amendment) Act 1947 (Imp) enabled the New Zealand Parliament to amend, 
suspend and repeal at any time all or any provisions of the Constitution Act 
1852. The passage of the Statute of Westminster Adoption Act 1947 and the New 
Zealand Constitution Amendment (Request and Consent) Act 194 7 marked the 
formal transition of New Zealand to full independence and finally, it attained 
142 Mai Chen and Geoffrey Palmer (eds) Public Law in New Zealand (1 ed, Oxford University 
Press, Auckland, 1993) 182. 
143 FM Brookfield "Kelsen, the Constitution and the Treaty" (1992) 15 ZULR 163, 171. 
144 Australia adopted the Statute of Westminster 1931 in 1942. 
Homepage of the University of Wi.irzburg <http: //www.uni-wuerzburg.de/law/as04000 _ .html> 
(last accessed 31 October 2002). 
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legal autonomy and full constituent powers. 145 However, the Imperial Parliament 
was still able to legislate for New Zealand by request and consent. This was the 
last barrier to complete legal and constitutional autonomy and was abolished by 
the Constitution Act 1986. 146 
5 The Constitution Act 1986 
Between 1852 and 1986, the originally existing 82 prov1s1ons of the 
Constitution Act 1852 were reduced to twelve. Although the Constitution Act 
1852 only ruled state organizations, and did not include a catalogue of basic 
rights, it became more and more obvious that these twelve provisions were not 
sufficient to organize the state reasonably. Sir Geoffrey Palmer commented on 
this lack quite accurately: "[t]he 1852 Constitution Act was a relic, harmless, but 
also useless". 147 
The 1984 constitutional cns1s exposed maJor uncertainties m New 
Zealand's constitutional law as well as its obsoleteness. Arguably, the New 
Zealand Government would have continued to function adequately, but 
nevertheless, this crisis generated a revision of New Zealand's constitutional 
laws. Therefore, a committee to review New Zealand's constitutional provisions 
was created to collect the most important ones into one statute and finally, the 
Constitutional Act 1986 was enacted. 148 It repealed formally the Constitution Act 
1852 and, although it did not provide many significant changes to the existing 
constitutional arrangements, it is important because it patriated the New Zealand 
145 Geoffrey Palmer and Matthew Palmer (eds) Bridled Power (3 ed, Oxford University Press, 
Auckland, 1997) 3. 
146 Geoffrey Palmer The l egal History and Framework of the New Zealand Constitution 
<http://www.chenpalm.co.nz/cpopinion4.asp?mID= l 7> (last accessed 31 October 2002). 
147 Geoffrey Palmer The legal History and Framework of the New Zealand Constitution, above. 
148 After the Labour Government was elected in 1984, the outgoing National Prime Minister, Sir 
Robert Muldoon, refused to devalue the dollar on the instructions of the new Government. 
Doubts arose whether, in law, an opposition party, which had won elections, could immediately 
form a government and take responsibility for necessary measures (in their view). 
R C Mascarenhas Th e New Zealand Civil Service <http://www.indiana.edu/- csrc/mascar4.htm1> 
(last accessed 31 October 2002). 
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constitution. It placed the basis of the New Zealand constitution within New 
Zealand. 149 
6 Current constitutional situation in New Zealand 
After depicting the constitutional history of New Zealand, it has to be 
stressed that although the New Zealand Parliament has enacted Constitutional 
Acts (1852/1986), these statutes did or rather do not fulfil the requirements of 
constitutions within the meaning of modern constitutionalism. Both govem(ed) 
only certain parts of state organization and are/were therefore not regarded as the 
constitutions of New Zealand. 150 As mentioned before, the unwritten New 
Zealand constitution consists of several laws and customs, which are embodied 
in both written and unwritten material. Due to the limited scope of this paper, the 
elements will only be listed and further reading will be recommended in 
footnotes. 
-+ Rule oflaw 151 
-+ Legislation 152 
-+ Constitutional Conventions 153 
-+ Letters Patent of the Governor-General 154 
-+ Treaty of Wai tangi 155 
149 Geoffrey Palmer and Matthew Palmer (eds) Bridled Power (3 ed, Oxford University Press, 
Auckland, 1997) 4. 
150 Although New Zealand never had a constitution in the classic meaning, two draft written 
constitutions are worth mentioning: 
1. Draft of the Constitutional Society for the Promotion of Economic Freedom and Justice 
in New Zealand (Inc.) submitted in 1961. 
2. Dr DE Paterson's draft for consideration by the ew Zealand Section of the 
International Commission ofJurists submitted in 1977. 
151 Raymond Douglas Mulholland ( ed) Introduction to the New Zealand Legal System ( 10 ed, 
Butterworths, Wellington, 2001) 19,20. 
152 Legislation that is important from a constitutional point of view is provided in the Appendix, 
part B. 
153 Homepage of the State Services Commission The Constitutional Setting 
<http: //www.ssc.govt.nz/display/document.asp?Nav1D=82&Doc1D= l 813> (last accessed 31 
October 2002). 
154 Morag McDowell and Duncan Webb (eds) The New Zealand Legal System (2 ed, 
Butterworths, Wellington, 1998) 104. 
155 Philip A Joseph (ed) Constitutional and Administrative Law in New Zealand (2 ed, Brookers, 
Wellington, 2001) 42,43. 
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Imperial enactments in force in New Zealand 156 
All these elements are relevant parts of the unwritten constitutional 
framework of New Zealand and establish together the constitutional body that 
governs the country. Nevertheless, constitutional change since 1986 has been 
directed at the development of a truly autochthonous constitution for New 
Zealand. This process is not yet complete and future constitutional change may 
include, for example, the abolition of the Privy Council, the establishment of 
New Zealand as a Republic, clauses addressing the status of the Treaty of 
Waitangi and the enactment of a written constitution. 157 
C Conclusion 
In relation to the constitutional history of both countries, Germany's 
seems more 'eventful'. The reason for this is, of course, the longer and more 
varied history of Germany or Europe as a whole. 158 On the other hand, 'eventful' 
meant, besides significant intellectual achievements, many wars and revolutions 
without whom the realization of constitutionalism would not have been possible. 
New Zealand was able to bring most ideas of constitutionalism into effect 
without any significant bloodshed. Today, similar constitutional approaches 
govern both countries and the question remains why New Zealand has never 
enacted a written entrenched supreme law. 
156 The Imperial Laws Application Act 1988 identifies clearly which Imperial enactments and 
Imperial subordinate legislation remain in force in ew Zealand. 
A list of some of these statutes is provided in the Appendix, part C. 
157 Geoffrey Palmer and Matthew Palmer (eds) Bridled Power (3 ed, Oxford University Press, 
Auckland, 1997) 311-316. 
158 Referring to the length and variety of German constitutional history as a reason for a more 
'eventful ' history is strictly speaking not correct because, as mentioned before, 'European New 
Zealand ' is a product of European development and therefore the, of course, longer English 
constitutional history can be regarded as part of the constitutional history of New Zealand also. 
This argument only makes sense if ew Zealand 's constitutional history is limited to the time 
after the Treaty (see above, n 122). 
A brief description of the constitutional history of the UK is provided by: 
Kenneth Clinton Wheare (ed) Modern Constitutions (2 ed, Oxford University Press, London, 
1966) 9 et seqq. 
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V A COMPARISON BETWEEN TWO APPROACHES OF REALIZING 
CONSTITUTIONAL/SM 
This chapter compares the approaches of Germany and New Zealand, 
examining written and unwritten constitutions in general as well as the historical 
development in both countries. Although there are some differences in terms of 
content, the author will examine the characteristics of writtenness, supreme law 
status and entrenchment only. 
A Writtenness and Entrenchment Introduced 
Writtenness, entrenchment and supreme law status are not equivalent. 
Nevertheless, in the case of Germany and New Zealand the general rule fits, 
stating that written constitutions are entrenched and have obtained supreme law 
status, whereas unwritten constitutions are not entrenched and have no supreme 
law status. First a general description will be provided. 
1 Differences between Written and Unwritten Constitutions 
A classification of constitutions on the basis of whether they are 
unwritten or written is strictly speaking not correct. 159 What is meant by this 
common distinction is that written constitutions are embodied in one document 
and unwritten constitutions are, as mentioned before, made up of several laws 
and customs that do happen to be written down in a series of documents . Besides 
this formal difference and the generally entrenched character of written 
constitutions, some more general distinctions can be found. 
While unwritten constitutions have developed gradually, written 
constitutions are either granted by the ruler or ordained by the people. Besides 
the executive and legislative branches of government, the courts, rulers, people, 
159 Joseph Raz "On the Authority and Interpretation of Constitutions" in Larry Alexander ( ed) 
Conslitutionalism - Philosophical Foundations (1 ed, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 
1998) 152, 154. 
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usages as well as legal theory contribute to the constant development of 
unwritten constitutions. Consequently, an unwritten constitution is more a 
process of growth and a written constitution may best be described as a creation 
or product, which is always newly made and set forth. This leads to another 
difference as the creation of written constitutions is influenced by the history of a 
country, whereas unwritten constitutions are not only defined by history, but also 
embody and mirror history themselves. 160 
Another difference between both kinds of constitutions 1s that written 
constitutions are often regarded as supreme law. This means firstly that the 
constitution has to be obeyed by every individual. 161 Secondly, all statutes, 
institutions and governmental activities have to be in accordance with the 
constitution and, in the event of inconsistency, may be declared unconstitutional 
and consequently void. 162 Thirdly, the constitution can normally only be 
amended by a special procedure and be abrogated by the people who created 
it. 163 In contrast, unwritten constitutions may, as a rule, be altered or abolished by 
the lawmaking power at any time and in any of their details. 164 This fact results 
in the incapability of further growth or expansion of written constitutions, which 
are always fixed and final, whereas unwritten constitutions are able to expand 
and develop and therefore meet changing public opinion and political theory. 165 
The last point mirrors the entrenchment of most written constitutions and 
the link between entrenchment and supreme law status. 
160 Second Amendment Foundation Written and Un written Constitutions 
<http: //www.saf.org/pub/rkba/books/BlacksConstitutionalLaw.htm> (last accessed 31 October 
2002). 
161 Homepage of the Stanford University Constitutionalism 
< http: //plato.stanford.edu/entries/constitutionalism> (last accessed 31 October 2002). 
162 Suri Ratnapala Th e idea of a Constitution and Why Constitutions Matter 
<http: //www.cis.org.au/Policy/SummOO/SummOO-l .pdf> (last accessed 31 October 2002). 
163 Kenneth Clinton Wheare (ed) Modern Constitutions (2 ed, Oxford University Press, London, 
1966) 15. 
164 CF Strong ( ed) Modern Political Constitutions (3 ed, Sidgwick & Jackson, London, 1949) 65 . 
165 O Hood Phillips and Paul Jackson ( eds) 0 Hood Phillips · Constitutional and Administrative 
Law (7 ed, Sweet & Maxwell, London, 1987) 25 . 
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2 Entrenched legislation 
In light of the differences between written and unwritten constitutions and 
especially the status of supreme law, all of these distinctions seem to come down 
to the issue of entrenchment. Therefore, the true ground of division, by virtue of 
the nature of the constitution itself, is whether it is flexible or rigid. 166 
(a) What is entrenchment? 
In general, entrenchment or self-embracing sovereignty is the process of 
enabling Parliament to make it more difficult for a law to be amended or 
repealed, thereby restricting future Parliaments from exercising their supreme 
powers by means of the establishment of specially prescribed procedures. 167 
Thus, entrenchment can involve a stricter vote requirement for the passage of 
legislation168 or even enacting legislation, which is impossible to amend by 
succeeding Parliaments. If a provision that prescribes restraints to the 
amendment of certain other provisions is among these protected provisions, one 
talks about double entrenchment. On the other hand, single entrenchment is 
given if the prescribing provision is not explicitly protected and can therefore be 
amended or repealed, for example, by a single majority of the members of 
Parliament. 169 The aim of entrenchment is to enshrine law or at least to exempt 
certain indispensable provisions from purely partisan decisions in Parliament, as 
the entrenched provisions can only be altered by a joint agreement of the major 
· 170 parties. 
Because the issue of entrenchment mostly affects alterations of 
constitutions, the proposed distinction between flexible and rigid constitutions 
166 This classification stems from Lord Bryce and is expounded by him in: 
James Bryce (ed) Studies in History and Jurisprudence Vol I (1 ed, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 
1901) 145-254. 
167 Morag McDowell and Duncan Webb (eds) The New Zealand l egal System (2 ed, 
Butterworths, Wellington, 1998) 126. 
168 For example, a two-thirds- vote of Parliament. 
169 Philip A Joseph (ed) Constitutional and Administrative law in New Zealand (2 ed, Brookers, 
Wellington, 2001) 16. 
170 Alan McRobie "The Electoral System" in Philip A Joseph (ed) Essays on the Constitution (1 
ed, Brookers, Wellington, 1995) 312, 317. 
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makes sense. Rigid constitutions contain provisions, which may not be altered at 
all or at least not in the ordinary way, whereas a flexible constitution does not 
prescribe any special procedure and can therefore be altered by simple majority 
of Parliament. 171 The following section juxtaposes the constitutions of Germany 
and New Zealand in relation to the question of entrenchment. 
(b) Entrenchment in New Zealand 
Based on Dicey's principle that the Parliament is sovereign with complete 
powers to alter any constitutional provision, and that it cannot be bound by the 
actions of its predecessors, 172 New Zealand was always critical of entrenched 
legislation. 173 However, this principle contains the paradox that, although 
Parliament obtains unlimited powers of legislation, it cannot, in any way, limit 
the powers that it has. 174 This paradox led to a reinterpretation of the sovereignty 
of Parliament, according to which Parliament may successfully bind its 
successors as to the procedures of law- making but not the substance or pith of 
legislation. 175 In this context, Parliament adopted the Electoral Act 1956 
(repealed) with its entrenching section 189. 
176 
Its successor, section 268 of the Electoral Act 1993, is today New 
Zealand's only example of constitutional entrenchment.
177 Apparently, single 
entrenchment by means of imposing certain procedural limitations on future 
171 b Joseph, a ove, 14. 
172 Albert Venn Dicey ( 1835-1922) was a jurist of great distinction. His classic treatise 
Introduction to the Study of the Law of the Constitution is still regarded as authoritative. 
Scott Gordon (ed) Controlling the State - Constitutionalismfrom Ancient Athens to Today (1 ed, 
Harvard University Press, London, 1999) 45/46. 
173 Kenneth John Scott ( ed) The New Zealand Constitution ( 1 ed, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1962) 
9 et seqq. 
174 Joseph, above, 16. 
175 Kenneth Clinton Wheare ( ed) Th e Constitutional Structure of the Commonwealth ( 1 ed, 
Oxford University Press, Wellington, I 960) 86/87. 
176 Although section 189 of the Electoral Act I 956 reserved certain provisions in that Act from 
repeal or amendment, it was not itself reserved because it was thought that such an attempt would 
be legally ineffective. 
Geoffrey Palmer "Chapter 20: Parliament" in Sir Robin Cooke ( ed) The Laws of New Zealand ( 1 
ed, Butterworths, Wellington, 1996) 4 Fn 7. 
Section 189 of the Electoral Act 1956 is provided in the Appendix, part D. 
177 Like its predecessor, section 268 of the Electoral Act 1993 is still not among the reserved 
provisions and can therefore be amended or repealed by a simple majority. 
Section 268 of the Electoral Act 1993 is provided in the Appendix, part D. 
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Parliaments is now accepted.
178 Notwithstanding the "swelling voices" 
179 that 
demand or recommend double entrenchment, the Government did not enact this. 
However, the fact that there has never been any attempt to ignore or subvert 
section 268 of the Electoral Act 1993 suggests that it has moral or conventional 
status. Thus, it seems that New Zealand has a very flexible constitution. 
180 
(c) Entrenchment in Germany 
According to Article 79(2) BL 1
81
, an amendment of the BL requires a two 
third majority of the members of the Bundesrat
182 and a two third majority of the 
votes of the Bundestag183 . Furthermore, pursuant to Article 79(3), certain 
provisions and principles of the BL are legally unalterable.
184 Therefore Article 
79(3) is called the perpetuity clause
185
• However, Article 79(3) is itself not 
among the unalterable provisions and can therefore, formally, be changed by a 
two- thirds majority. If the ratio legis
186 of Article 79(3) is recognised, it must be 
interpreted as being among the saved provisions as well. The only way to abolish 
these provisions and principles is to enact a completely new constitution that, 
according to Article 146, has to be concluded freely and uninfluenced by the 
German people. 
178 For the sake of completeness, it shall be mentioned that any proposal for the entrenchment of 
an Act in New Zealand must itself be carried in a committee of the whole House, by the majority 
ordinarily required for the amendment or repeal of the provision to be entrenched. 
Geoffrey Palmer "Chapter 20: Parliament" in Sir Robin Cooke ( ed) The Laws of New Zealand ( I 
ed, Butterworths, Wellington, 1996) I O 1. 
179 Mai Chen and Geoffrey Palmer (eds) Public Law in New Zealand (1 ed, Oxford University 
Press, Auckland, 1993) 67. 
180 ote for the discussion in New Zealand about which parts of the electoral law should be 
entrenched and which not: 
Alan McRobie "The Electoral System" in Philip A Joseph ( ed) Essays on the Constitution ( 1 ed, 
Brookers, Wellington, 1995) 312, 342 et seq; Chen/Palmer, above, 66 et seqq. 
181 This provision applies to all Articles of the BL. 
182 Federal Council. 
183 Federal Parliament. 
184 Article 79(3) BL refers to the basic principles of federalism, to Article I (human dignity) and 
A1iicle 20 (basic state principles e.g. democracy, republic, social state, rule of law). 
Bruno Schmidt-Bleibtreu and Franz Klein (eds) Kommentar zum Grundgesetz fiir die 
Bundesrepublik Deutsch/and (6 ed, Luchterhand, Dortmund, 1983) 855 . 
1ss Heinz Dieter Bulka and Susanne Luecking (eds) Facts about Germany (4 ed, Lexikon-Institut 
BertelsmAM, Guetersloh, 1985) 96. 
186 Ratio /egis means the objective sense of a certain provision. 
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As Article 79(2) is itself only alterable by a two-third majority, the 
German constitution is double entrenched. Adding the fact that certain provisions 
cannot be amended at all, the BL can be regarded as a very rigid constitution. 
3 Conclusion 
Considering the general meanings of writtenness, entrenchment and 
supreme law status, the initially mentioned approaches to constitutionalism in 
Germany and New Zealand become more clear. As Germany is governed by a 
comparatively rigid constitution and New Zealand's constitutional framework 
only contains one single entrenched provision, all three characteristics highlight 
significant differences in these frameworks. 
B Advantages and Disadvantages of Both Approaches 
This chapter examines the respective advantages and disadvantages of the 
characteristics of these two kinds of constitution. Being aware of the fact that 
advantages on the one side result in disadvantages on the other side, this paper 
will nevertheless try to provide a meaningful partitioning. To simplify matters, 
the following chapter uses the terms written and unwritten to refer to supreme, 
written, and entrenched constitutions on the one hand, and unwritten non 
entrenched on the other hand. 
I Disadvantages of written constitutions 
Written constitutions can be reproached for being inflexible. In comparison 
to unwritten constitutions, they establish iron rules which, when found 
inconvenient, are difficult to change. This leads inevitably to two advantages. 
First, they enable the state to react reasonably and effectively in the event of a 
constitutional crisis, and second, they are conferred a degree of resilience to 
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subversion.187 However, this lack of flexibility can be seen as an obstacle for 
legal developments necessary in a growing or changing society. Written 
constitutions account for different new customs only after years and are therefore 
often antiquated and not up to date. 188 
Unwritten constitutions ' treatment of short-term matters can sometimes 
be even more rigid than that of written ones in respect of long-standing social 
rules and conventions. Each elimination, alteration or re-interpretation of such 
rules typically requires widespread changes in traditional attitudes, beliefs and 
behaviour, which probably lasts decades. 189 
Another disadvantage of written constitutions is that they can hardly meet 
the high expectations they are supposed to fulfil. It is sometimes very difficult to 
express the solemn principles of constitutionalism in words without taking on too 
much at once when drafting the constitution. Additionally, written constitutions 
run the risk of invading the domain of ordinary legislation, instead of being 
restricted to fundamental rules. 
2 Advantages of written constitutions 
Many advantages of written constitutions just mirror the other side of the 
com, or in other words, advantages of unwritten constitutions are actually 
interpreted as advantages of written ones. 
In contrast to the advantageous flexibility of unwritten constitutions, the 
inflexible written constitutions in turn guarantee more stability. They are not 
subject to perpetual change at the will of the lawmaking power, as any 
amendment requires an exacerbated process. The only security against instability 
and precipitate changes of unwritten constitutions is the conservatism of the 
187 Antoine Clark The Case f or Written Constitutions: Even Broken or Bad Promises Are Better 
in Writing <http://www.libertarian.co.uk/lapubs/legan/legan024.pdf> (last accessed 31 October 
2002). 
188 Raymond Douglas Mulholland (ed) Introduction to the New Zealand Legal System (10 ed, 
Butterworths, Wellington, 2001 ) 28 . 
189 Homepage of the Stanford University Constitutionalism 
<http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/constitutionalism> (last accessed 31 October 2002). 
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lawmaking power and its political responsibility to the people. 190 But is this a 
reliable factor in terms of limited government? The more difficult and time-
consuming an amendment of the constitution is, the less likely it is that a moral 
panic will sustain the credulity of the public long enough for subversion to be 
achieved. Arguably, an entrenched constitution hampers beneficial reforms as 
well, but good things take time - good intentions acted upon hastily may not be 
desirable. 
Another significant advantage of written constitutions is one of a practical 
nature. One text that contains the sum of what state authority consists of, 
describes how state power is constituted and how it is used and, last but not least, 
provides a catalogue of basic rights, gives clarity and legal security (another 
essential part of constitutionalism). 191 Further, the fact that a written single 
document is available for everybody, both inhabitants and visitors of the 
respective country, provides trust in the state. 
3 Conclusion 
A final answer to the question of which approach is preferable has to take 
into account the original meaning and purpose of constitutionalism, the limitation 
of government. It is the author's opinion that entrenchment and supreme law 
status are indispensable elements of a constitution and compulsory requirements 
of the very possibility of constitutionally limited government. If a Government 
were entitled, at its pleasure, to change the very terms of its constitutional 
limitations, there would, in reality, be no such limitations at all. This statement 
shows the paradox of all-embracing parliamentary sovereignty from a different 
perspective and clarifies that New Zealand's constitutional framework does not 
meet the requirements of constitutionalism. If state power can be limited by 
customs, there is no certainty of law at all because any custom is 
190 Second Amendment Foundation Written and Unwritten Constitutions 
<http://www.saf.org/pub/rkba/books/BlacksConstitutionalLaw.htm> (last accessed 31 October 
2002). 
191 Antoine Clark The Case for Written Constitutions: Even Broken or Bad Promises Are Better 
in Writing <http://www.libertarian.co.uk/1apubs/legan/1egan024.pdt> (last accessed 31 October 
2002). 
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broadly interpretable. Defining custom as compromise necessary between current 
public opinion and the government's sense of virtue leaves room for various 
abuses of state power. Unfortunately, it is not reasonable to believe that 
democracy could be preserved by radical democratic means nowadays. 
Apart from this major advantage of written constitutions, they also enable 
all citizens to have access to the basis of the political system. This fosters at the 
same time an awareness of democracy and civic rights, as well as duties among 
the citizens. In the case of an unwritten constitution, only a few acquire a broad 
knowledge as to be capable of interpreting and understanding the whole 
constitutional framework and the respective interrelations. The widespread 
unawareness of all features of an unwritten constitution might even allow minor 
violations to be unnoticed by the public. 
With respect to the alleged lack of flexibility and adaptability of written 
constitutions, the question arises how much flexibility and adaptability is really 
necessary. As a constitution is only supposed to contain fundamental principles, 
it is likely that these principles will not change within short spans of time. It 
took, for example, more than 2,000 years to evolve basic rights and principles of 
democracy to their current status. If social changes are incisive, each written 
constitution will be able to adapt to the new situation reasonably. It must not be 
forgotten that state power is, according to Locke, conferred by the people and if 
the people agree on abolishing the current state order, nobody can or is entitled to 
avoid it. Arguing from the other side, no written constitution can provide 
absolute protection from change. However, there is no reason to oppose any 
change when the nature of a future society cannot be accurately predicted. 
The most significant advantage of supreme law status is that the 
legislative power is controllable and limited by a superior court. 192 The Federal 
Constitutional Court is regarded as the Huter der Verfassung 193 and ensures that 
all state action is in compliance with the BL. Its rulings are binding for all other 
constitutional organs of the Federation or the Lander, as well as for all courts and 
public authorities. 194 The United States Supreme Court's authority is even 
192 For example the Bundesverfassungsgericht (Federal Constitutional Court) in Germany, the 
Supreme Court in the United States or the High Court of Australia. 
193 Guardian of the constitution. 
194 Howard D Fisher ( ed) The German legal System and legal language (3 ed, Cavendish 
Publishing, London, 2002) 18. 
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extended to private law in cases where the parties in dispute are citizens of 
different states. 195 On the other hand, as superior courts are entitled to strike 
down legislation and are independent in their decisions, it can be argued that they 
are too powerful and that too much depends on the quality of these courts. 
Furthermore, their composition is understandably a matter of concern to the 
politicians of the Parliament and it is difficult to create a selection procedure, 
which is in accordance with the principles of democracy and checks and 
balances. 196 As a last resort, the superior courts would be placed in the position 
of legislator, usurping the vote of Parliament. 
However, an additional state organ controlling the legislature restrains the 
power of Parliament by all means, even if the judges are politically biased. 
Judge's independence or quality is never guaranteed, but the moral binding effect 
of a written constitution should not be underestimated and each law-abiding 
society should be believed to be capable of appointing trustworthy and 
competent judges. Thus, it is the author's opinion that a supreme law guarded by 
a supreme court fulfils the demands of the checks and balances more 
appropriately than all-embracing parliamentary sovereignty. 
A final feature of written constitutions is that they might serve as a basis 
for a whole society everybody can refer to, as a document that serves the people 
by creating a uniting institution they are proud of. 197 In conclusion, after a 
thorough consideration of all arguments, the author strongly supports the written 
constitution approach. 
C Reasons for New Zealand's Apathy towards a Written Constitution 
Many reasons for New Zealand's unwillingness to enact a written 
constitution in the United States' or German style stem from the legal 
195 Donald P Konuners (ed) The Constitutional Jurisprudence of the Federal Republic of 
Germany (1 ed, Duke University Press, Durham and London, 1989) 3. 
196 The Federal Constitutional Court, for example, consists of two senates each of them being 
composed of eight professional judges. In order to stay in compliance with democratic principles 
and the checks and balances, these judges are elected by the Bundestag and the Bundesrat 
equitably. 
Sabine Michalowski and Loma Woods (eds) German Constitutional Law (1 ed, Dartmouth 
publishing Company Limited, Aldershot, 1999) 37. 
197 A well known example is the American Constitution. 
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understanding of parliamentary sovereignty and entrenched legislation, the 
inherited common law system or from the other above listed arguments contra 
written and pro unwritten constitutions. 198 Notwithstanding these various 
explanations, the main reason is most evidently provided by a comparison of 
New Zealand and German constitutional history. 
1 Constitutional continuity in general 
Constitutional and historical continuity are the decisive keywords in this 
context. According to Sir Kenneth Clinton Wheare, the origin of all modem 
constitutions lies in the people's desire to make a fresh start, which means to 
break with the legal past and begin again by proclaiming and creating a new 
order. 199 Catalysts for enacting a (new) constitution may be the wish to unite 
under a new govemment,200 when communities had been released of 
dependencies as the result of a war,201 a revolution,202 or defeat in war. 203 Breaks 
in the legal and historical continuity of states always generated the necessity of 
the establishment of a new order. With the upcoming constitutionalism in the 
United States and Europe, the respective political communities were inspired to 
symbolize this new order in a readily identifiable and quotable constitutional 
document. 204 
2 Constitutional continuity in Germany 
The German history, in contrast to New Zealand, is marked with several 
legal and historical breaks and all of them were followed by significant 
constitutional changes. The Peace of Augsburg put an end to the riots and unrests 
198 See above. 
199 Kenneth Clinton Wheare (ed) Modern Constitutions (2 ed, Oxford University Press, London, 
1966) 6. 
200 E.g. United States in 1787, Australia in 1901. 
201 E.g.: Austria, Hungary, Czechoslovakia after World War I 1918. 
202 France in 1789, Russia in 1917. 
203 Germany in 1919 and 1949, France in 1875 and 1946. 
204 Philip A Joseph (ed) Constitutional and Administrative Law in New Zealand (2 ed, Brookers, 
Wellington, 2001) 121. 
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m the course of Martin Luther' s Reformation. The Peace of Westphalia 
terminated the Thirty Year War. The constitutions of the Lander in the 1820's 
and 1830's were a result of the Congress of Vienna that in tum was supposed to 
restructure Europe after Napoleon's wars. The Paulskirchenverfassung was 
drafted after the 1848-revolution. The constitution of the North German 
Confederation came into effect after Prussia's war against Austria. The 
Bismarck'sche Reichsverfassung established the German Empire after the 
German- French War in 1870/71. Finally, the Weimarer Reichsverfassung and 
the BL came into effect after World War I and ·world War II, respectively. 
3 Constitutional continuity in New Zealand 
In New Zealand, only two incidents have disturbed constitutional 
continuity. The first was the war between Maori and British forces in the l 860's 
that triggered the first independence movements of the settlers in New Zealand. 
After the end of the war in 1872 and after economic prosperity had overtaken the 
depression of the 1880's, nationalistic feelings subsided again. 205 The second 
occasion when New Zealand reconsidered its destiny was the proposed union 
with the Australian colonies in the l 880/90's. However, New Zealand refused to 
join a Federation, as it would have lost "its political identity, its independence, its 
right to nationhood". 206 Apart from these brief periods, New Zealand's 
development from Crown colony to an independent sovereign State was rather 
'uneventful'. 207 Actually, New Zealand was very reluctant to gain full legal 
independence because of the strong ties to the United Kingdom. Even after New 
Zealand had acceded dominion status in 1907, its leaders turned down dominion 
nationalism and emphasized the indivisible unity of the British Empire.208 After 
the peaceful gaining of legal autonomy in 1947, New Zealand has also never 
205 A more comprehensive description of this war is provided in: 
James Belich ( ed) Th e New Zealand Wars - and the Victorian interpretation of racial conflict ( I 
ed, Auckland University Press, Auckland, 1986). 
206 Keith Sinclair (ed) A destiny apart - New Zealand's Search for National identity (1 ed, Allen 
& Unwin, Wellington, 1986) 119. 
207 Compare chapter IY/B "The development of ew Zealand ' s unwritten constitution". 
208 J B Condliffe (ed) The Welfare State in New Zealand (1 ed, Unwin Brothers, London, 1959) 
327 et seqq. 
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experienced anything that might have caused the State to break with its legal 
past.209 
4 Conclusion 
Reflecting on reasons for New Zealand's apathy, the facts are self-
explanatory. New Zealand never needed a "fresh start" as a result of a war or a 
revolution, and its evolvement towards sovereignty took decades. Germany, on 
the other hand, experienced several moments in its history where it needed a 
"fresh start". Consequently, the most interesting question is why these 
constitutional 'incidents' or phases have never occurred in New Zealand but have 
in Germany. Why was Germany's way to its modem constitutional system so 
different from New Zealand? 
One reason could be the shortness of New Zealand's constitutional 
history,210 which is, admittedly, a weak argument as Germany had four "fresh 
starts" since 1840. Nevertheless, it is a point that should not be underestimated. 
A more appropriate ground for the long-lasting and peaceful process towards 
sovereignty is that in contrast to Europe and Germany, the gaining of 
independence has obviously never been a significant issue in New Zealand. 
This was due to two reasons. Firstly, Britain has never exercised its 
Imperial power in the way it did in the United States, which might have 
generated stronger independence movements. Quite the contrary, it was the 
Crown that fostered independence, and not its New Zealand colony that was a bit 
'in a huff and felt betrayed of this policy in the beginning because of the close 
relationship with the United Kingdom. New Zealand never had to fight for its 
independence, "because the Americans had done that for them".
211 Secondly, 
from first settlement on, the settlers and pioneers in New Zealand were of a very 
special character. Due to the fact that they needed to settle new land and develop 
fresh resources, they were seldom interested in dealing with doctrines, theories 
209 Philip A Joseph (ed) Constitutional and Administrative Law in New Zealand (2 ed, Brookers, 
Wellington, 2001) 123. 
210 See above, n 122. 
211 Keith Sinclair "The native born: The origins of New Zealand nationalism" (1986) Occasional 
Publication o. 8, Massey Memorial Lecture 11. 
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and national introspection. As a consequence of this, the people's nature tended 
more towards pragmatism, practical solutions and adaptation to physical 
environment, which in tum induced a preoccupation with economic development 
issues.212 The people who left Europe in order to migrate to New Zealand had 
other problems than, for example, the Germans in the 19th century, and as long as 
the Crown did not intervene in their activities, they did not incline to change the 
constitutional system at all. This attitude towards way of life to New Zealand and 
to the Crown, became something like a political tradition among New 
Zealanders. Two examples illustrate this more vividly. New Zealand's change 
from a 'colony' to 'dominion' in 1907 failed to attract public attention just as the 
gaining of legal autonomy in 194 7 did. Even the bill leading to the Constitution 
Act 1986 received only a paltry eight submissions after being introduced and 
referred to the select committee.213 In the author's opinion, the close relationship 
with the United Kingdom and its policy towards New Zealand's independence on 
the one hand, and the described political tradition were and are the main 
contributors to New Zealand's apathy in constitutional matters .214 
With regard to German constitutional ' incidents ', one has to distinguish 
between revolutions and upheavals on the one hand, and wars on the other. 
The only German revolution was the 1848 revolution. It was at last 
triggered by the French Revolution of 1789, which can be regarded as the major 
change from monarchical thinking to democracy in Europe. Without the 
preparatory work of the Frenchmen, the Paulskirchenverfassung would never 
have been drafted, at least not in 1848. It is probable that a revolution like the 
French revolution would not have been possible in Germany at all due to its 
decentralized state organization, but it was only a matter of time until the 
revolution would have swept over to Germany. The example of the French 
Revolution and its effects on Germany leads inevitably to one reason for 
Germany's and New Zealand 's different development. Even if Germany has 
never been the final trigger of major upheavals, it was, in contrast to New 
2 12 Alexander Brady (ed) Democracy in the Dominions (3 ed, OUP, London, 1958) eh 20. 
213 Philip A Joseph (ed) Constitutional and Administrative Law in New Zealand (2 ed, Brookers, 
Wellington, 2001 ) 126. 
21 4 Sinclair, above, 11 : 
Doctrines of 'ex traterritorial ity' and 'repugnancy' stirred neither pub li c interest nor passion in the Kiwi 
breas t. Certainly they aroused no thoughts of revolu tion 
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Zealand, always in the centre of world affairs, geographically and idealistically. 
At least until World War I, all world powers were European countries and 
therefore Europe was the melting pot of world policy. Located between France 
and the UK in the west, and Austria-Hungary and Russia in the east, Germany 
was coercively involved in each major conflict, whereas New Zealand was an 
island with only one major neighbour (Australia) that was an English colony as 
well. 
However, the three following German constitutions were enacted after 
wars - wars, for whose breakout Germany was either fully responsible 
(Bismarck's wars, World War 11) or at least partly responsible (World War I). 
One reason is certainly again Germany's geographical location and its position in 
the structures of world power during the last 200 years, but another approach is 
worth mentioning as well. Just as the New Zealand temperament and attitudes 
partly explain New Zealand's apathy in constitutional matters, typical German 
characteristics have, at least, facilitated Germany's tendency towards war. These 
typical German characteristics can briefly be described as absolute loyalty to the 
authorities and the need for strong leadership. 215 To clarify this, the Germans 
were never hungry for war, but they were willing tools in the hands of 
charismatic leaders like Bismarck in the war against France (1870/71 ), 
Hindenburg and Ludendorff in World War I and Adolf Hitler in World War II. 
The German soul tended apparently to accept what it was told. Arguably, the 
reasons for this are based in historical, political and sociological circumstances of 
the last 600 years and are not as easy to explain as the New Zealand tendency 
towards pragmatism. However, it is nevertheless questionable that the Germans 
have never had any serious revolution and always followed their authority into 
war. 
The illustrated differences between both countries provide a vivid 
explanation for New Zealand's apathy on the one hand and the eventful 
constitutional history of Germany on the other hand. Although the term apathy 
has a slightly negative connotation, it has to be admitted that New Zealand's way 
was much more peaceful. Even if the author favours the current German 
215 An interesting evaluation of this point of view is provided in: 
Heinrich Mann (ed) Der Untertan (The Subject) (1 ed, Kurt WolffVerlag, Leipzig, 1918). 
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constitution, the question remams unanswered whether the pnce for this 
achievement was too high. 
D Conclusion 
Considering the listed advantages and disadvantages of written 
constitutions as well as historical factors, the final answer to the question, 
whether the German or New Zealand system is preferable, comes down to the 
question of what amount of control is necessary to guarantee a peaceful social 
existence of human beings. 
The principles of limited government were not developed without reason 
m Europe. Hobbes' Leviathan, for example, emerged in the setting of the 
devastating Thirty Year War. European history proved that homo homini lupus 
est was not fiction but rather an alarming reality. Apparently, Europe and 
Germany needed more constitutionalism than New Zealand in order to guarantee 
a peaceful status quo. Although this has not deterred several European countries 
from ending up in revolutions or in war, it was obviously necessary to define the 
relationship between the state and its citizens in the described way. Finally, who 
can presume to know what would have happened without, for example, 
Germany's different constitutions? 
Without supporting anarchical ideas, it is (unfortunately) essential to 
organize social co-existence of human beings by enacting state power. The 
consistent realization of constitutionalism has proved to be able to govern states 
properly. The German constitution is the more consequential realization of 
limited government, in comparison to New Zealand's constitutional framework 
that leaves much more space for arbitrariness and abuse of power. As long as 
reasonable people govern New Zealand, there will not be any problems, but who 
can predict the future? 
One 'popular' example for the insufficiency of New Zealand's 
constitutional framework is the BORA. As it is not entrenched, it currently has 
only the status of an ordinary statute, and can further even be overridden by other 
Acts according to s 4. Lord Cooke of Thorndon has been cited for commenting 
that the BORA "is regarded internationally as one of the weakest affirmations of 
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human rights."216 This fact raises the question whether the BORA is compatible 
with the principles of limited government and international legal obligations.217 
Although New Zealand is a successful and peaceful country and there is no 
urgent cause for enacting a written constitution, an entrenched written and 
supreme constitution is apparently the more appropriate way to govern New 
Zealand in accordance with constitutional principles and to comply with its 
international obligations. 
VI CONCLUSION 
This comparison between the German and New Zealand constitutional 
history has served to clarify why both approaches to constitutionalism are so 
different. The author has come to the conclusion that written constitutions are 
generally preferable, even if the constitutional framework of New Zealand has 
served to govern the country reasonably. 
Nevertheless, New Zealand scholars are equally divided in supporting a 
written entrenched constitution with supreme law status and maintaining the 
basic principles of its constitutional framework. Equally contentious is the 
question of New Zealand's system of government. Should New Zealand become 
216 Ministry of Justice Re-evaluation of the Human Rights Protections in New Zealand 
(Wellington, 2000) para 51 
<http://www.j ustice. govt.nz/justicepubs/reports/2000/hr _ reevalua tion/part_ 2.htrnl> (last accessed 
31 October 2002). 
217 The UN Human Rights Committee released a damning statement on the Bill of Rights Act 
1990 when commenting on New Zealand's third periodic report on the implementation of the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights in 1995, which echoed Lord Cooke's 
concerns: 
The Committee regrets that the provisions of the Covenant have not been fully incorporated into domestic 
Jaw and given overriding status in the legal system. Article 2, paragraph 2, of the Covenant requires states 
parties to take such legislative or other measures which may be necessary to give effect to the rights 
recognized in the Covenant. ln this regard the Committee regrets that certain rights guaranteed under the 
Covenant are not reflected in the Bill of Rights and that it does not repeal earlier inconsistent legislation 
and has no higher status than ordinary legislation . The Committee notes that it is expressly possible, under 
the terms of the Bill of Rights , to enact legislation contrary to its provisions and regrets that this appears to 
have been done in a few cases. 
in: Concluding Observations of the Human Rights Committee: ew Zealand (3 October 1995) 
CCPR/C/79/Add. 47, para 176. 
A comprehensive description of this problem area is provided in: 
Paul Rishworth "The Rights Debate: Can We, Should We, Adopt a Written Constitution Including 
a Bill of Rights" in Colin James (ed) Building the Constitution (I ed, Brebner Print, Wellington, 
2000) 400-413. 
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a republic or retain a parliamentary monarchy in the Commonwealth?218 
However, it is without any doubt that due to the constitutional crisis in 1984, the 
unclear fulfilment of international legal obligations by the BORA and the 
changing legal status of the Treaty, the constitutional framework of New Zealand 
is at the moment subject of interest. 
Resulting from the broadly acknowledged necessity of a change or at 
least a reform, the Institute of Policy Studies agreed in 1997 to run a conference. 
The Building the Constitution conference was held on 7-8 April at Parliament in 
Wellington and was intended to evaluate different issues for reform. More than 
40 papers were submitted from widely varying perspectives and were considered 
at the conference by more than 100 people of widely different backgrounds.21 9 
Unfortunately the conference failed in initiating any common understanding of 
New Zealand's constitutional future. 220 Quite the contrary, the gap between the 
opposite parties was even increased and it became quiet obvious that the 
discussion on the constitution will continue. 
It is social, economic, cultural, and political debate that underlies any constitution . 
. . . New Zealand will come face to face with its own constitutional destiny. We 
should seek a uniquely New Zealand identity for our system of democratic 
government. What form that will take will depend, ultimately, on what sort of 
· h"nk 22 1 society we t 1 we are. 
2 18 In the view of one prominent ew Zealand constitutional scholar: 
ew Zealand , like Australia, though a constitutiona l monarchy in form, is a de facto republ ic with the 
Governor-General functi oning virtually as a Pres ident appointed by an elected Pri me Minister. 
FM Brookfield "Republican New Zealand: Legal Aspects and Consequences" (1995) Z Law 
Rev 310,310. 
2 19 A thematic summary of the discussions and a compilation of the papers is provided in: 
Colin James (ed) Building the Constitution (1 ed, Brebner Print, Wellington, 2000) 
220 Philip A Joseph (ed) Constitutional and Administrative Law in New Zealand (2 ed, Brookers, 
Wellington, 2001) 128. 
221 Geoffrey Palmer and Matthew Palmer (eds) Bridled Power (3 ed, Oxford University Press, 
Auckland, 1997) 316. 
This book also contains a proposal for a Constitution Act of New Zealand, which is provided in 
the Appendix, part E. 
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VIII APPENDIX 
A Relevant Provisions of the German Basic Law 
Preamble (original version): 
The German People 
In the Lander of Baden, Bavaria, Bremen, Hamburg, Hesse, Lower Saxony, North-
rhine-Westphalia, Rhineland-Palatinate, Schleswig-Holstein, Wlirttemberg-Baden and 
W lirttemberg-Hohenzo llern, 
conscious of their responsibility before God and men, 
animated by the resolve to preserve their national and political unity and to serve the 
peace of the world as an equal partner in a united Europe, 
desiring to give a new order to political life for a transitional period, 
have enacted, by virtue of their constituent power, this Basic Law for the Federal 
Republic of Germany. 
They also have acted on behalf of those Germans to whom participation was denied. 
The entire German people are called upon to achieve in free self-determination the 
unity and freedom of Germany. 
Preamble (current version): 
Conscious of their responsibility before God and man, 
Inspired by the determination to promote world peace as an equal partner in a united 
Europe, the German people, in the exercise of their constituent power, have adopted 
this Basic Law 
Germans in the Lander of Baden-Wlirttemberg, Bavaria, Berlin, Brandenburg, 
Bremen, Hamburg, Hesse, Lower Saxony, Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania, North-
Rhine-Westphalia, Rhineland-Palatinate, Saarland, Saxony, Saxony-Anhalt, 
Schleswig-Holstein, and Thuringia have achieved the unity and freedom of Germany 
in free self-determination. This Basic Law thus applies to the entire German people. 
Article 23 Jurisdiction of the Basic Law ( original version) 
For the time being, this Basic Law shall apply in the territory of the Lander of Baden, 
Bavaria, Bremen, Greater Berlin, Hamburg, Hesse, Lower Saxony, North Rhine 
Westphalia, Rhineland-Palatinate, Schleswig-Holstein, Wlirttemberg-Baden, and 
Wtirttemberg-Hohenzollem. In other parts of Germany it shall be put into force on 
their accession. 
61 
Article 79 Amendment of the Basic Law 
(1) This Basic Law may be amended only by a law expressly amending or 
supplementing its text. In the case of an international treaty respecting a peace 
settlement, the preparation of a peace settlement, or the phasing out of an occupation 
regime, or designed to promote the defense of the Federal Republic, it shall be 
sufficient, for the purpose of making clear that the provisions of this Basic Law do not 
preclude the conclusion and entry into force of the treaty, to add language to the Basic 
Law that merely makes this clarification. 
(2) Any such law shall be carried by two thirds of the Members of the Bundestag and 
two thirds of the votes of the B undesrat. 
(3) Amendments to this Basic Law affecting the division of the Federation into 
Lander, their participation on principle in the legislative process, or the principles laid 
down in Articles 1 and 20 shall be inadmissible. 
Article 146 Duration of validity of the Basic Law (original version) 
This Basic Law shall cease to be in force on the day on which a constitution adopted 
by a free decision of the German people comes into force. 
Article 146 Duration of validity of the Basic Law (current version) 
This Basic Law, which since the achievement of the unity and freedom of Germany 
applies to the entire German people, shall cease to apply on the day on which a 
constitution freely adopted by the German people takes effect. 
B New Zealand Statutes that Embody Co11stitutional Principles 
Legislature Act 1908 
Judicature Act 1908 
Evidence Act 1908 
Official Appointments and Documents Act 1919 
Acts Interpretation Act 1924 
District Courts Act 194 7 
Crown Proceedings Act 1950 
Geneva Conventions Act 1958 
Continental Shelf Act 1964 
Race Relations Act 1971 
Local Government Act 1974 
Ombudsmen Act 1975 
Treaty ofWaitangi Act 1975 
Human Rights Commission Act 1977 
Official Information Act 1982 
Acts Interpretation Amendment Act 1983 
Parliamentary Service Act 1985 
Constitution Act 1986 
State-Owned Enterprises Act 1986 
State Sector Act 1988 
Imperial Laws Application Act 1988 
Foreign Affairs Act 1988 
Public Finance Act 1989 
Acts and Regulations Publication Act 1989 
Bill of Rights Act 1990 
Electoral Act 1993 
Privacy Act 1993 
Human Rights Act 1993 
Fiscal Responsibility Act 1994 
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C Relevant English and United Kingdom Statutes 
Magna Charta 1297 
Habeas Corpus Acts 1640, 1679, 1816 
Bill of Rights 1688 
Act of Settlement 1700 
Statute of Westminster 1931 
D New Zealand Legislation containing entrenching provisions 
Section 189 Electoral Act 1956 (Repealed) 
Restriction on amendment or repeal of certain provisions 
(1) This section applies to the following provisions (hereinafter referred to as reserved 
provisions), namely: 
(a) Section 17(1) of the Constitution Act 1986, relating to the term of 
Parliament: 
(b) Section 15 of this Act, relating to the Representation Commission: 
( c) Section 16 of this Act, and the definition of the tem1 General electoral 
population in subsection (1) of section 2, relating to the division of 
New Zealand into General electoral districts after each census: 
( d) Section 17 of this Act, relating to the allowance for the adjustment of 
the quota: 
(e) Section 39 of this Act, and; the definition of the term adult in 
subsection (1) of section 2 of this Act, and paragraph (e) of section 99, 
so far as those provisions prescribe 18 years as the minimum age for 
persons qualified to be registered as electors or to vote: 
(f) Section 106 of this Act, relating to the method of voting. 
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(2) No reserved provision shall be repealed or amended unless the proposal for the 
amendment or repeal 
(a) Is passed by a majority of 75 percent of all the members of the House 
of Representatives; or 
(b) Has been carried by a majority of the valid votes cast at a poll of the 
electors of the [General] and Maori electoral districts: 
Provided that this section shall not apply to the repeal of any reserved provision by a 
consolidating Act in which that provision is re-enacted without amendment and this 
section is re-enacted without amendment so as to apply to that provision as re-enacted. 
(3) Repealed by s79 of the Electoral Amendment Act 1990. 
Section 268 Electoral Act 1993 
(1) This section applies to the following prov1s10ns (hereinafter referred to as 
reserved provisions), namely: 
(a) Section 17(1) of the Constitution Act 1986, relating to the term of 
Parliament: 
(b) Section 28 of this Act, relating to the Representation Commission: 
(c) Section 35 of this Act, and the definition of the term General electoral 
population in section 3(1), relating to the division of New Zealand into 
General electoral districts after each census: 
(d) Section 36 of this Act, relating to the allowance for the adjustment of the 
quota: 
(e) Section 74 of this Act, and; the definition of the term adult in section 3(1) 
of this Act, and section 60(f) of this Act, so far as those provisions 
prescribe 18 years as the minimum age for persons qualified to be 
registered as electors or to vote: 
(f) Section 168 of this Act, relating to the method of voting. 
(2) No reserved provision shall be repealed or amended unless the proposal for the 
amendment or repeal 
(c) Is passed by a majority of 75 percent of all the members of the House 
of Representatives; or 
(d) Has been carried by a majority of the valid votes cast at a poll of the 
electors of the General and Maori electoral districts: 
Provided that this section shall not apply to the repeal of any reserved provision by a 
consolidating Act in which that provision is re-enacted without amendment and this 
section is re-enacted without amendment so as to apply to that provision as re-enacted. 
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E A Proposed Constitution Act of New Zealand 
An Act to institute a Constitution as the supreme law of New Zealand 
WHEREAS 
(1) New Zealand is a democratic society based on the rule of law and on principles of 
freedom, equality and the dignity and worth of the human person; 
(2) New Zealand does not have a Constitution enjoying the Status of Supreme Law 
and it is desirable to change that situation and adopt a Constitution; 
(3) The Maori, as tangata whenua o Aotearoa, and the Crown entered in 1840 into a 
solemn contract known as Te Tiriti o Waitangi or the Treaty of Waitangi, and it is 
desirable to recognize and affirm the Treaty as Part of the Supreme Law of New 
Zealand; 
(4) New Zealand in 1978 ratified the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights; 
(5) It is desirable to guarantee the human rights and fundamental freedoms of all the 
people of New Zealand without discrimination; 
BE IT ENACTED by the Parliament of New Zealand as follows: 
1. Short title and commencement 
(1) This Act may be cited as the Constitution of New Zealand 
(2) This Act shall come into force on 1 January 2000 
2. Entrenchment 
PART I 
GENERAL PROVISIONS 
No provision of this Constitution shall be repealed or amended unless the proposal for 
the repeal or amendment -
(a) Is passed by a majority of 75 percent of all the members of the House of 
Representatives; or 
(b) Has been carried by a majority of the valid votes cast at a poll of all 
electors eligible to vote in New Zealand. 
3. Legal effect of Constitution 
(1) Wherever a law can be given a meaning that is consistent with the Constitution, 
that meaning must be preferred to any other meaning. 
(2) Where there is an inconsistency between any law and the Constitution, the 
Constitution must prevail. 
PART II 
The Treaty of Waitangi/Te Tiriti o Waitangi 
4. The Treaty of Waitangi/Te Tiriti o Waitangi 
(1) The rights of the Maori people under the Treaty ofWaitangi/Te Tiriti o Waitangi 
are hereby recognized and affirmed. 
(2) The Treaty of Waitangi/Te Tiriti o Waitangi shall be considered as always . 
speaking and shall be applied to circumstances as they arise so that effect may be 
given to its spirit and intent. 
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(3) The Treaty of Waitangi/Te Tiriti o Waitangi means the Treaty as set out in Maori 
and English in the Schedule to this Act. 
S. Court appointment of amicus curiae 
In any proceedings in which the question of consistency with the Treaty of 
Waitangi/Te Tiriti o Waitangi is in issue, the court may appoint an amicus curiae to 
represent any party who, in the opinion of the court, should be represented and who, 
but for the appointment of the amicus curiae, would be unrepresented. 
6. Head of State 
PART III 
The Sovereign 
(1) The Sovereign in right of New Zealand is the head of State of New Zealand, and 
shall be known by the royal style and titles proclaimed from time to time. 
(2) The Governor-General appointed by the Sovereign is the Sovereign's 
representative in New Zealand. 
7. Exercise of royal powers by the Sovereign of the Governor-General 
(1) Every power conferred on the Governor-General by or under any Act is a royal 
power which is exercisable by the Governor-General on behalf of the Sovereign, 
and may accordingly be exercised either by the Sovereign in person or by the 
Governor-General. 
(2) Every reference in any Act to the Governor-General in Council or any other like 
expression includes a reference to the Sovereign acting by and with the advice 
and consent of the Executive Council. 
8. Regency 
(1) Where, under the law of the United Kingdom, the royal functions are being 
performed in the name and on behalf of the Sovereignty by a Regent, the royal 
functions of the Sovereign in right of New Zealand shall be performed in the 
name and on behalf of the Sovereign by that Regent 
(2) Nothing in subsection (1) of this section limits, in relation to any power of the 
Sovereign in right of New Zealand, the authority of the Governor-General to 
exercise that power. 
9. Demise of the Crown 
(1) The death of the Sovereign shall have the effect of transferring all the functions, 
duties, powers, authorities, rights, privileges, and dignities belonging to the 
Crown to the Sovereign's successor, as determined in accordance with the 
enactment of the Parliament of England entitled The Act of Settlement (12&13 
Will. 3, c.2) and any other law relating to the succession to the Throne, but shall 
otherwise have no effect in law for any purpose. 
(2) Every reference to the Sovereign in any document or instrument in force on or 
after the commencement of this Act shall, unless the context otherwise requires, 
be deemed to include a reference to the Sovereign's heirs and successors. 
66 
The Executive 
10. Ministers of Crown to be members of Parliament 
(1) A person may be appointed and may hold office as a member of the Executive 
Council or as a Minister of the Crown only if the person is a member of 
Parliament. 
(2) Notwithstanding subsection (1) of this section, 
(a) A person who is not a member of Parliament may be appointed and may 
hold office as a member of the Executive Council or as a Minister of the 
Crown if that person was a candidate for election at the general election of 
members of the House of Representatives held immediately preceding that 
person's appointment as a member of the Executive Council or as a 
Minister of the Crown but shall vacate office at the expiration of the 
period of 40 days beginning with the date of the appointment unless, 
within that period, that person becomes a member of Parliament; and 
(b) Where a person who holds office both as a member of Parliament and as a 
member of the Executive Council or as a Minister of the Crown ceases to 
be a member of Parliament, that person may continue to hold office as a 
member of the Executive Council or as a Minister of the Crown until the 
expiration of the 28th day after the day on which that person ceases to be a 
member of Parliament. 
11. Power of member of Executive Council to exercise Minister's powers 
Any function, duty, or power exercisable by or conferred on any Minister of the 
Crown (by whatever designation that Minister is known) may, unless the context 
otherwise requires, be exercised or performed by any member of the Executive 
Council. 
12. Appointment of Parliamentary Under-Secretaries 
(1) The Governor-General may from time to time, by warrant under the Governor-
General's hand, appoint any member of Parliament to be a Parliamentary Under-
Secretary in relation to such Ministerial office or offices as are specified in that 
behalf in the warrant of appointment. 
(2) A Parliamentary Under-Secretary shall hold office as such during the pleasure of 
the Governor-General, but shall in every case vacate that office within 28 days of 
ceasing to be a member of Parliament. 
13. Functions of Parliamentary Under-Secretaries 
(1) A Parliamentary Under-Secretary holding office as such in respect of any 
Ministerial office shall have and may exercise or perform under the direction of 
the Minister concerned such of the functions, duties, and powers of the Minister 
of the Crown for the time being holding that office as may from time to time be 
assigned to the Parliamentary Under-Secretary by that Minister. 
(2) Nothing in subsection (1) of this section limits the authority of any minister of the 
Crown to exercise or perform personally any function, duty, or power. 
(3) The fact that any person holding office as a Parliamentary Under-Secretary in 
respect of any Ministerial office purports to exercise or perform any function, 
duty, or power of the Minister concerned shall be conclusive evidence of that 
person's authority to do so. 
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The Legislature 
14. House of Representatives 
(1) There shall continue to be a House of Representatives for New Zealand 
(2) The House of Representatives is the same body as the House of Representatives 
referred to in section 10 of the Constitution Act 1986 
(3) The House of Representatives shall be regarded as always in existence, 
notwithstanding that Parliament has been dissolved or has expired. 
(4) The House of Representatives shall have as its members those persons who are 
elected from time to time in accordance with the provisions of the Electoral Act 
1993, and who shall be known as 'members of Parliament'. 
15. Oath of allegiance to be taken by members of Parliament 
(1) A member of Parliament shall not be permitted to sit or vote in the House of 
Representatives until that member has taken the Oath of Allegiance in the form 
prescribed in section 17 of the Oaths and Declarations Act 1957. 
(2) The oath to be taken under this section shall be administered by the Governor-
General or a person authorised by the Governor-General to administer that oath. 
16. Election of Speaker 
The House of Representatives shall, at its first meeting after any general election of its 
members, and immediately on its first meeting after any vacancy occurs in the office 
of Speaker, choose one of its members as its Speaker, and every such choice shall be 
effective on being confirmed by the Governor-General. 
17. Speaker to continue in office notwithstanding dissolution or expiration of 
Parliament 
A person who is in office as Speaker immediately before the dissolution or expiration 
of Parliament shall, notwithstanding that dissolution or expiration, continue in office 
until the close of polling day at the next general election unless that person sooner 
vacates office as Speaker. 
Parliament 
18. Parliament 
(1) There shall continue to be a Parliament of New Zealand, which consists of the 
Sovereign in right of New Zealand and the House of Representatives. 
(2) The Parliament of New Zealand is the same body as that which was established 
by section 14 of the Constitution Act 1986. 
19. Power of Parliament to make laws 
Subject to this Constitution the Parliament of New Zealand continues to have full 
power to make laws. 
20. Royal assent to Bills 
A Bill passed by the House of Representatives shall become law when the Sovereign 
or the Governor-General assents to it and signs it in token of such assent. 
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21. Term of Parliament 
The term of Parliament shall, unless Parliament is sooner dissolved, be 3 years from 
the day fixed for the return of writs issued for the last preceding general election of 
members of the House of Representatives, and no longer. 
22. Summoning, proroguing, and dissolution of Parliament 
(1) The Governor-General may by Proclamation summon Parliament to meet at such 
place and time as may be appointed therein, notwithstanding that when the 
Proclamation is signed or when it takes effect Parliament stands prorogued to a 
particular date. 
(2) The Governor-General may by Proclamation prorogue or dissolve Parliament. 
(3) A Proclamation summoning, proroguing, or dissolving Parliament shall be 
effective 
(a) On being gazetted; or 
(b) On being publicly read, by some person authorised to do so by the 
Governor-General, in the presence of the Clerk of the House of 
Representatives and 2 other persons, 
whichever occurs first. 
(4) Every Proclamation that takes effect pursuant to subsection (3)(b) of this section 
shall be gazetted as soon as practicable after it is publicly read. 
23. First meeting of Parliament after general election 
After any general election of members of Parliament, Parliament shall meet not later 
than 6 weeks after the day fixed for the return of the writs for that election. 
24. Carrying over of Parliamentary business 
Where the House of Representatives resolves that any Bill, petition, or other business 
before it or any of its committees be carried over to the next session of Parliament 
(whether the same Parliament or not), that Bill, petition, or other business shall not 
lapse upon the prorogation or dissolution or expiration of the Parliament in being when 
that resolution is passed but shall be carried over accordingly. 
Parliament and Public Finance 
25. Bills appropriating public money 
The House of Representatives shall not pass any Bill providing for the appropriation of 
public money or for the imposition of that charge has been recommended to the House 
of Representatives by the Crown. 
26. Parliamentary control of public finance 
It shall not be lawful for the Crown, except by or under an Act of Parliament-
(a) To levy a tax; or 
(b) To raise a loan or to receive any money as a loan from any person; or 
(c) To spend any public money. 
The Judiciary 
27. Protection of Judges against removal from office 
A Judge of the High Court shall not be removed from office except by the Sovereign 
or the Governor-General, acting upon an address of the House of Representatives, 
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which address may be moved only on the grounds of that Judge's misbehaviour or of 
that Judge's incapacity to discharge the functions of that Judge's office. 
28. Salaries of Judges not to be reduced 
The salary of a Judge of the High Court shall not be reduced during the continuance of 
the Judge's commission. 
PARTIV 
BILL OF RIGHTS 
General Provisions 
29. Bill of Rights 
(1) The rights and freedoms contained in the Bill of Rights are guaranteed. 
(2) The provisions of this Part of this Act shall be known as the Bill of Rights. 
30. Justified limitations 
The rights and freedoms contained in this Bill of Rights may be subject only to such 
reasonable limits prescribed by law as can be demonstrably justified in a free and 
democratic society. 
32. Other rights and freedoms not affected 
An existing right or freedom shall not be held to be abrogated or restricted by reason 
only that the right of freedom is not included in this Bill of Rights or is included only 
in part. 
33. Application to legal persons 
Except where the provisions of this Bill of Rights otherwise provide, the provisions of 
this Bill of Rights apply, so far as practicable, for the benefit of all legal persons as 
well as for the benefit of all natural persons. 
Life and Security of the Person 
34. Right not to be deprived of life 
No one shall be deprived of life except on such grounds as are established by law and 
are consistent with the principles of fundamental justice. 
35. Right not to be subjected to torture or cruel treatment 
Everyone has the right not to be subjected to torture or to cruel, degrading, or 
disproportionately severe treatment or punishment. 
36. Right not to be subjected to medical or scientific experimentation 
Every person has the right not to be subjected to medical or scientific experimentation 
without that person's consent. 
37. Right to refuse to undergo medical treatment 
Everyone has the right to refuse to undergo any medical treatment. 
Democratic and Civil Rights 
38. Electoral rights 
Every New Zealand citizen who is of or over the age of 18 years -
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(a) Has the right to vote in genuine periodic elections of members of the 
House of Representatives, which elections shall be by equal suffrage and 
by secret ballot; and 
(b) Is qualified for membership of the House of Representatives. 
39. Freedom of thought, conscience, and religion 
Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience, religion, and belief, 
including the right to adopt and to hold opinions without interference. 
40. Freedom of expression 
Everyone has the right to freedom of expression, including the freedom to seek, 
receive, and impart information and opinions of any kind in any form. 
41. Manifestation of religion and belief 
Every person has the right to manifest that person's religion or belief in worship, 
observance, practice, or teaching, either individually or in community with others, and 
either in public or in private. 
42. Freedom of peaceful assembly 
Everyone has the right to freedom of peaceful assembly. 
43. Freedom of association 
Everyone has the right to freedom of association. 
44. Freedom of movement 
(1) Everyone lawfully in New Zealand has the right to freedom of movement and 
residence in New Zealand. 
(2) Every New Zealand citizen has the right to enter New Zealand. 
(3) Everyone has the right to leave New Zealand. 
(4) No one who is not a New Zealand citizen and who is lawfully in New Zealand 
shall be required to leave New Zealand except under a decision taken on grounds 
prescribed by law. 
Non-Discrimination and Minority Rights 
45. Freedom from discrimination 
(1) Everyone has the right to freedom from discrimination on the grounds of colour, 
race, ethnic or national origins, sex, marital status, religious or ethical belief, 
disability, age, political opinion, employment status, family status or sexual 
orientation. 
(2) Measures taken in good faith for the purpose of assisting or advancing persons or 
groups of persons disadvantaged because of colour, race, ethnic or national 
origins, sex, marital status, religious or ethical belief, disability, age, political 
opinion, employment status, family status or sexual orientation do not constitute 
discrimination. 
46. Rights of minorities 
A person who belongs to an ethnic, religious, or linguistic minority in New Zealand 
shall not be denied the right, in community with other members of that minority, to 
enjoy the culture, or profess and practice the religion, or to use the language, of that 
minority. 
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Search, Arrest, and Detention 
47. Unreasonable search and seizure 
Everyone has the right to be secure against unreasonable search or seizure, whether of 
the person, property, or correspondence or otherwise. 
48. Liberty of the person 
Everyone has the right not to be arbitrarily arrested or detained. 
49. Rights of persons arrested or detained 
(1) Everyone who is arrested or who is detained under any enactment-
(a) Shall be informed at the time of the arrest or detention of the reason for it; 
and 
(b) Shall have the right to consult and instruct a lawyer without delay and to 
be informed of that right; and 
(c) Shall have the right to have the validity of the arrest or detention 
determined without delay by way of habeas corpus and to be released if 
the arrest or detention is not lawful. 
(2) Everyone who is arrested for an offence has the right to be charged promptly or to 
be released. 
(3) Everyone who is arrested for an offence and is not released shall be brought as 
soon as possible before a court or competent tribunal. 
(4) Everyone who is-
(a) Arrested; or 
(b) Detained under any enactment-
for any offence or suspected offence shall have the right to refrain from 
making any statement and to be informed of that right. 
(5) Everyone deprived ofliberty shall be treated with humanity and with respect for 
the inherent dignity of that person. 
50. Rights of person charged 
Everyone who is charged with an offence-
( a) Shall be informed promptly and in detail of the nature and cause 
of the charge; and 
(b) Shall be released on reasonable terms and conditions unless there 
is just cause for continued detention; and 
( c) Shall have the right to consult and instruct a lawyer; and 
(d) Shall have the right to adequate time and facilities to prepare a 
defence; and 
( e) Shall have the right, except in the case of an offence under 
military law tried before a military tribunal, to the benefit of a 
trial by jury when the penalty for the offence is or includes 
imprisonment for more than 3 months; and 
(f) Shall have the right to receive legal assistance without cost if the 
interests of justice so require and the person does not have 
sufficient means to provide for that assistance; and 
(g) Shall have the right to have the free assistance of an interpreter if 
the person cannot understand or speak the language used in 
court. 
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51. Minimum standards of criminal procedure 
Everyone who is charged with an offence has, in relation to the determination of the 
charge, the following minimum rights: 
(a) The right to a fair and public hearing by an independent and impartial 
court; 
(b) The right to be tried without undue delay; 
(c) The right to be presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law; 
(d) The right not to be compelled to be a witness or to confess guilt; 
(e) The right to be present at the trial and to present a defence; 
(f) The right to examine the witnesses for the prosecution and to obtain the 
attendance and examination of witnesses for the defence under the same 
conditions as the prosecution; 
(g) The right, if convicted of an offence in respect of which the penalty has 
been varied between the commission of the offence and sentencing, to the 
benefit of the lesser penalty; 
(h) The right, if convicted of the offence, to appeal according to law to a 
higher court against the conviction or against the sentence or against both; 
(i) The right, in the case of a child, to be dealt with in a manner that takes 
account of the child's age. 
52. Retroactive penalties and double jeopardy 
(1) No one shall be liable to conviction of any offence on account of any act or 
omission which did not constitute an offence by such person under the law of 
New Zealand at the time it occurred. 
(2) No one who has been finally acquitted or convicted of, or pardoned for, an 
offence shall be tried of punished for it again. 
53. Right to justice 
(1) Every person has the right to the observance of the principles of natural justice by 
any tribunal or other public authority which has the power to make a 
determination in respect of that person's rights, obligations, or interests protected 
or recognised by law. 
(2) Every person whose rights, obligations, or interests protected or recognised by 
law have been affected by a determination of any tribunal or other public 
authority has the right to apply, in accordance with law, for judicial review of that 
determination. 
(3) Every person has the right to bring civil proceedings against, and to defend civil 
proceedings brought by, the Crown, and to have those proceedings heard, 
according to law, in the same way as civil proceedings between individuals. 
PARTY 
Miscellaneous Provisions 
54. Enforcement of Constitution 
(1) Any person may seek a declaration in the High Court that any of the following 
are inconsistent with the Constitution-
( a) Any law; 
(b) Any action by the sovereign, legislative, executive or judicial branches of 
the government of New Zealand; 
73 
( c) Any action by a person or body in the performance of any public function, 
power, or duty conferred or imposed on that person or body by or 
pursuant to law. 
(2) Where any law or action has been held by any court to be inconsistent with the 
Constitution, the court may make such orders as are fair and reasonable in the 
circumstances in order to remedy any person adversely affected by the action. 
55. Involvement of Attorney-General in proceedings 
In any proceedings in which the questions of consistency with any part of the 
Constitution is raised, the Attorney-General may be joined as a party, and if not joined 
may intervene. 
56. Interpretation 
In this Act, unless the context otherwise requires, 
'Constitution' means the provisions of this Act. 
'Law' means any enactment in force at the commencement of this Act, any enactment 
made after the commencement of this Act, and any rule of common law. 
57. Repeals 
(1) The Constitution Act 1986 is repealed. 
(2) The New Zealand's Bill of Rights Act 1990 is repealed. 
SCHEDULE 
Te Tiriti o Waitangi/The Treaty of Waitangi 
(Text is provided in Maori and in English) 
74 
F Preliminary Draft of a Constitutional Treaty 
The aim of this text is to illustrate the possible articulation of a treaty. The inclusion 
(or non inclusion) in Part I of some articles, and the exact content of others, will 
depend on the Convention's proceedings. Their treatment in this text is in no way 
intended to prejudge the result of the Convention's debates. 
This draft was drawn up by the Praesidium and presented by the President at the 
Plenary session on 28 October 2002. 
TREATY ESTABLISHING A CONSTITUTION FOR EUROPE 
Part One: Constitutional Structure 
Preamble 
Title I: Definition and objectives of the Union 
Article 1 
- Decision to establish [ an entity called the European Community, European Union, 
United States of Europe, United Europe]. 
- A Union of European States which, while retaining their national identities, closely 
coordinate their policies at the European level, and administer certain common 
competences on a federal basis. 
- Recognition of the diversity of the Union. 
- A Union open to all European States which share the same values and commit 
themselves to promote them jointly. 
Article 2 
This article sets out the values of the Union: human dignity, fundamental rights, 
democracy, the rule of law, tolerance, respect for obligations and for international law. 
Article 3 
Objectives of the Union 
This article establishes the general objectives, such as: 
protection of the common values, interests and independence of the Union 
promotion of economic and social cohesion 
strengthening of the internal market, and of economic and monetary union 
promotion of a high level of employment and a high degree of social protection 
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a high level of environmental protection 
encouragement for technological and scientific progress 
creation of an area of liberty, security and justice 
development of a common foreign and security policy, and a common defence 
policy, to defend and promote the Union's values in the wider world. 
These objectives shall be pursued by appropriate means, depending on whether 
competences are allocated wholly or partly to the Union, or exercised jointly by the 
Member States. 
Article 4 
Explicit recognition of the legal personality of the [European Community/Union, 
United States of Europe, United Europe] 
Title II: Union citizenship and fundamental rights 
Article 5 
This article establishes and defines Union citizenship: every citizen of a Member State 
is a citizen of the Union; enjoys dual citizenship, national citizenship and European 
citizenship; and is free to use either, as he or she chooses; with the rights and duties 
attaching to each. 
The article sets out the rights attaching to European citizenship (movement, residence, 
the right to vote and to stand as a candidate in municipal elections and elections to the 
European Parliament, diplomatic protection in third countries, right of petition, right 
to write to, and obtain a reply from, the European institutions in one's own language). 
The article establishes the principle that there shall be no discrimination between 
citizens of the Union on grounds of nationality. 
Article 6 
The wording of this article will depend on the proceedings of the Working Group on 
the Charter. 
It could be modelled on Article 6 of the Treaty on European Union. 
It could: 
either refer to the Charter; 
or state the principle that the Charter is an integral part of the Constitution, with 
the articles of the Charter being set out in another part of the Treaty or in an 
annexed protocol; 
or incorporate all the articles of the Charter. 
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Title III: Union competence and actions 
Article 7 
This article sets out the principles of Union action, which must be carried out in 
accordance with the provisions of the treaty, within the limits of the competences 
conferred by the treaty, and in compliance with the principles of subsidiarity and 
proportionality. 
Article 8 
This article establishes the principle that any competence not conferred on the Union 
by the Constitution rests with the Member States. 
It establishes the primacy of Union law in the exercise of the competences conferred 
on the Union. 
It would set out the rules for effective monitoring of subsidiarity and proportionality. 
The role of National Parliaments in this respect would be mentioned. 
It determines the rules governing the adaptability of the system (Article 308). 
It sets out the obligation of loyal cooperation of Member States vis-a-vis the Union, 
and the principle that the acts of the Institutions are implemented by the Member 
States. 
Article 9 
This article lists the categories of Union competence. 
Article 10 
This article indicates the areas of exclusive Union competence. 
Article 11 
This article indicates the areas of competence shared between the Union and the 
Member States. It establishes the principle that, as and when the Union takes action in 
these areas, the Member States may act only within the limits defined by the Union 
legislation. 
Article 12 
This provision indicates the areas in which the Union supports or coordinates action 
by the Member States, but does not have competence to legislate. 
Article 13 
In certain areas the Member States may define and pursue common policies, within 
the Union framework and according to specific rules. This article indicates these 
areas. 
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Title IV: Union institutions 
Article 14 
This article: 
establishes that the Union has a single institutional structure; 
stipulates that this structure shall ensure the consistency and continuity of the 
policies and activities carried out in order to attain the Union's objectives -
activities both in the areas of competence allocated wholly or partly to the Union 
and in those areas in which competence belongs to the Member States and is 
jointly exercised by them; 
lists the institutions of the Union; 
establishes the principle whereby each institution acts within the limits of the 
powers conferred upon it by this treaty, in accordance with the procedures and 
under the conditions and for the purposes laid down in this treaty in each area; 
enjoins the Institutions to provide and promote open, effective and unostentatious 
administration; 
establishes the principle of loyal cooperation in relations between the institutions. 
Article 15 
This article defines the European Council, its composition and its tasks. 
Article 15 bis 
When the Convention has discussed it, this article could establish the term of office 
and appointment procedure for the Presidency of the European Council, its role and 
responsibilities. 
Article 16 
This article establishes the composition of the European Parliament, the members of 
which are elected by direct universal suffrage. 
It lists the powers of the European Parliament, and provides for the possibility of the 
European Parliament introducing a motion of censure on the activities of the 
Commission, and the procedure and consequences of such a motion. 
Article 17 
This article lists the composition and the duties of the Council, and would refer to the 
Council's formations. 
Article 17 bis 
This provision establishes the rule governing the appointment of the Presidency of the 
Council, its role, responsibilities, and term of office. 
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Article 18 
This article would contain the provisions governing the composition and duties of the 
Commission (including monopoly of initiative). According to the future deliberations 
of the Convention, it would envisage the Commission either as a small college or as a 
larger body, and would set out its decision-making rules. 
Article 18 bis 
This article would establish the role and appointment procedure for the Presidency of 
the Commission. 
Article 19 
This article would raise the possibility of establishing a Congress of the Peoples of 
Europe, determine its composition and the procedure for appointing its members, and 
define its powers. (It would be drafted in the light of the Convention's work.) 
Article 20 
This article sets out the composition and powers of the Court of Justice, and the Court 
of First Instance, and the principal grounds for bringing action in the Court. 
Article 21 
This provision sets out the composition and powers of the Court of Auditors, and its 
mandate. 
Article 22 
This article would define the composition and tasks of the European Central Bank, as 
well as the composition of its Governing Council and Executive Board. 
Article 23 
This provision should establish that the European Parliament, the Council and the 
Commission will be assisted by an Economic and Social Committee and a Committee 
of the Regions, organs acting in an advisory capacity. 
Title V: Implementation of Union action 
Article 24 
This article lists the different instruments available to the Union's institutions for the 
exercise of their competences. 
Article 25 
Clear description of the legislative procedures of the Union : procedures for the 
adoption of laws and framework laws, etc. 
Article 26 
Clear description of the procedures for the adoption of decisions, etc. 
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Article 27 
Description of implementing procedures in respect of the instruments listed at Article 
24, and how their operation is to be monitored. 
Article 28 
This article should define the procedures for the implementation of supporting actions 
(including programmes) and the arrangements for monitoring them. 
Article 29 
This article would set out implementing procedures in the sphere of common foreign 
and security policy. 
Article 30 
This article would set out implementing procedures in the sphere of common defence 
policy. 
Article 31 
This article would set out implementing procedures for policies on police matters and 
against crime. 
Article 32 
This provision should establish: 
the conditions for undertaking enhanced cooperation within the framework of the 
Treaty; 
if necessary, areas of the Treaty excluded from enhanced coooperation; 
the principle of applying the relevant provisions of the Treaty in adopting the 
acts necessary for implementing enhanced cooperation; 
the obligations of states participating in enhanced cooperation, and of those not 
so participating. 
Title VI : The democratic life of the Union 
Article 33 
This article establishes the principle that all Union citizens are equal vis-a-vis its 
institutions. 
Article 34 
This article sets out the principle of participatory democracy. The Institutions are to 
ensure a high level of openness, permitting citizens' organisations of all kinds to play 
a full part in the Union's affairs. 
Article 35 
This provision would refer to a protocol containing provisions for elections to the 
European Parliament by a uniform procedure in all Member States. 
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Article 36 
This provision establishes the rule that the legislative debates of the European 
Parliament and of the Council in its legislative form shall be public. 
Article 37 
This provision would establish the voting rules of the Union's institutions, including 
the definition of qualified majorities, and the implementation of the possibility of 
"constructive abstention" and its consequences. 
Title VII: The finances of the Union 
Article 38 
This provision states that the Union budget is fully financed by own resources and sets 
out the procedure for establishing the system of own resources. 
Article 39 
This provision should contain the principle that the budget should be in balance, as 
well as provisions concerning budgetary discipline. 
Article 40 
This article should: 
specify that all Union revenue and expenditure should be the subject of forecasts 
for each financial year and should be entered in the budget; 
describe the procedure for adopting the budget. 
Title VIII: Union action in the world 
Article 41 
This provision should set out who represents the Union in international relations, 
taking account of competences already exercised by the Community. 
In the light of the Convention's future work, it would define the role and future rank of 
the High Representative for Common Foreign and Security Policy. 
Title IX: The Union and its immediate environment 
Article 42 
This article could contain provisions defining a privileged relationship between the 
Union and its neighbouring States, in the event of a decision on the creation of such a 
relationship. 
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Title X: Union Membership 
Article 43 
This article establishes the principle that the Union is open to all European States 
which share its values and wish to pursue them jointly, which strictly respect 
fundamental rights, and which accept the Union's rules of operation. 
Article 44 
This article establishes the procedure for access10n of new member states to the 
European Union. 
Article 45 
This article establishes the procedure for suspension of Union membership rights if a 
Member State violates the principles and values of the Union. 
Article 46 
This article would mention the possibility of establishing a procedure for voluntary 
withdrawal from the Union by decision of a Member State, and the institutional 
consequences of such withdrawal. 
Part Two: Union Policies and their Implementation 
This part would contain the legal bases. For each area it should specify the type of 
competence (Title III) and the acts and procedures (Title VJ to be applied, in line with 
what is decided for Part I Technical amendments will be necessary to ensure that 
Part II correctly matches Part I 
Final Title: 
Part Three: General and Final Provisions 
Article x 
Repeal of previous treaties. Legal continuity in relation to the 
European Community and the European Union. 
Article x + 1 
Territorial application. 
Article x + 2 
Protocols: the protocols annexed to the treaty form an integral part 
of it. 
Article x + 3 
Procedure for revision of the constitutional treaty. 
Article x + 4 
Adoption, ratification, and entry into force of the constitutional 
treaty. 
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Article x + 5 
Duration: the treaty is concluded for an unlimited period. 
Article x + 6 
Languages: m which the Treaty 1s drawn up and which are 
authentic. 
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